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THE ORIGIN OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: 
LABOR, INTENT, AND FATHERS 
DARA E. PURVIS∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Most theories of parentage fail to explain the genesis of the right to parent—for example, 
why does a biological relationship generate parental rights? This Article shows that the law 
of parental rights mirrors theories of acquiring property, and that the law has shifted over 
time, from favoring a property right based in genetics to a Lockean theory of property rights 
earned through labor. The growth of Lockean labor-based theories is epitomized in reforms 
to parentage laws that incorporate functional theories of parenting, meaning that adults 
who perform caretaking work that creates a significant relationship with children are     
recognized as legal parents, even if they are not genetically related to the child. A labor-
based understanding of parentage may even reach to gestational work performed by the 
pregnant woman.  
 This Lockean labor-based theory, however, poses a challenge to male parental rights, 
because men have fewer opportunities to contribute labor for the benefit of the child. This 
disparity is heightened in the context of unwed biological fathers, who must create a signifi-
cant relationship with the child before gaining constitutional parental rights. This Article 
argues that intent to be a father, as demonstrated through behavior preparing for a child’s 
arrival, should be incorporated into labor-based theories of parentage. Including an intent-
based approach will thus address a gendered inequality in existing parental law. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Jonathan and Lorraine are the biological parents of Jessica. When 
Jessica was born, Jonathan visited the two in the hospital every day 
until they were discharged. Rather than return to the home she had 
shared for two years with Jonathan, however, Lorraine moved else-
where and did not tell Jonathan where she and Jessica had gone. For 
about one year, Jonathan was occasionally able to find Lorraine, and 
when she allowed him to do so, he visited Jessica. Eventually Jona-
than hired a private detective to find Lorraine, who by that time had 
married another man who had legally adopted Jessica, meaning that 
Jonathan was now a legal stranger to his biological daughter. Lor-
raine said he could not visit Jessica, and if he tried to do so she would 
have him arrested. 
 Jonathan attempted to assert his rights as a parent in court, chal-
lenging Jessica’s adoption and seeking to be recognized as her legal 
father. Although he advanced his case to the Supreme Court,1 Jona-
than Lehr was unsuccessful in his efforts to be identified as Jessica’s 
father.2 Rejecting his argument that his fundamental rights as a par-
ent were violated when Jessica was adopted without his permission 
or knowledge,3 the Court held that unwed biological fathers do not 
have constitutional rights as parents until they take on parental re-
sponsibilities and create a substantial relationship with their biologi-
cal child.4 If they are unable to do so—in the case of Jonathan Lehr, 
even if they are prevented from doing so by another party—states are 
free to enact laws that do not recognize them as legal parents.5 Alt-
hough most jurisdictions currently provide unwed biological fathers 
with methods to assert their paternity, such fathers must satisfy spe-
cific procedural requirements and in some circumstances can be 
blocked from asserting their paternity as Jonathan Lehr was.6 Such 
biological fathers are thus legal strangers to their child and can       
be absolutely barred from even asking for custody or visitation with 
the child. 
 By contrast, biological mothers are uniformly identified by state 
law as legal parents.7 There is thus a stark difference in the statutory 
 1. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 2. Id. at 267-68. 
 3. Id. at 265. 
 4. Id. at 261-62.   
 5. See id. at 262. It is worth noting that the Lehr opinions do not give an explanation 
as to why the mother wished to keep Lehr from his biological child.  
 6. James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Mak-
ing About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 865-81 (2003). 
 7. Id. at 859-60. 
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and constitutional interests of biological mothers and fathers.8 The 
Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly rejected equal protection 
claims arguing that it is unconstitutional to use separate rules turn-
ing on the biological parents’ gender.9 
 The different treatment of biological mothers and fathers raises 
two troubling sets of issues, both theoretical and doctrinal. First, 
making it more difficult for otherwise similarly situated mothers and 
fathers to secure status as legal parent seems problematically conso-
nant with stereotypes that women are better or more natural parents 
than men. Second, divergent requirements placed on biological par-
ents obscures the significance of biology as a doctrinal rule. Genetic 
relationships are often where the process of identifying legal parents 
starts, and in many circumstances genetics are alone sufficient to 
determine legal parentage.10 In the context of unmarried biological 
fathers, however, biology is generally both necessary and sufficient 
for the purpose of imposing a child support obligation, yet it is neces-
sary but not sufficient if the biological father seeks parental rights.11 
Not only is this at least superficially inconsistent, but the additional 
burden placed upon unwed biological fathers indicates that the theo-
ry underlying how parentage is acquired has not yet been answered. 
If a biological relationship is not always a trigger for recognition as a 
legal parent, then why is it ever a trigger? It seems intuitive that the 
genetic parents of a child are where analysis should start, but why 
does the genetic relationship generate parental rights? 
 This Article begins with that question—how are parental rights 
acquired?—as a stepping-off point to explain the law as it exists to-
day and to propose doctrinal reforms creating a more unified parent-
age regime. I argue that the law of parental rights mirrors theories of 
acquiring property, and that the law has shifted over time, from fa-
voring a property right based in genetics to a Lockean theory of prop-
erty rights earned through labor. This analysis has both descriptive 
and normative value, showing that the current constitutional under-
standing of fatherhood is both inconsistent and gendered. A growing 
understanding of parentage as created through labor helps to explain 
the law’s current treatment of fathers, particularly unwed biological 
fathers. It also points to a specific doctrinal amendment: understand-
 8. As will be discussed further below, adjudications of the constitutional rights of 
unwed biological fathers have arisen in the context of challenges to state laws that do not 
recognize such men as legal fathers. For obvious reasons, biological mothers have not 
brought similar challenges, as they are consistently identified as legal mothers by state 
law. Descriptions of the constitutional interests of biological mothers have thus generally 
appeared in suits brought by unwed biological fathers, often contrasting the two. 
 9. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64-65, 68 (2001); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265-68; Par-
ham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 356 (1979). 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11.  See infra Part III.C. 
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ing prebirth parental labor by unwed biological fathers as fulfilling 
the constitutional requirement that an unwed biological father create 
a substantial relationship with his child before his status as parent 
accrues constitutional rights. In my proposed substantial prebirth 
labor test, labor is evaluated as a demonstration of intent, addressing 
some of the traditional criticisms of intent-based theories as well as 
generating broader possibilities for incorporating labor-based uses of 
intent in parentage law.  
 In Part II, I explain my account of the acquisition of parental sta-
tus as analogous to the acquisition of property, explaining a move 
from parentage as bodily unity to the increasing strength of labor-
based theories of parentage. Part III addresses fatherhood as labor: 
where fatherhood is imposed and withheld and the treatment of the 
constitutional parental rights of unwed biological fathers. Part IV 
proposes treating the intent to parent, as demonstrated in prebirth 
labor by unwed biological fathers, as satisfying the requirement that 
an unwed biological father have a substantial relationship with his 
child before his parental status exists as a constitutional matter. I 
also suggest expansions of the labor-based theory of intent beyond 
the context of unwed biological fathers to include postbirth labor, 
married biological fathers, same-sex couples, and expanding the 
number of legal parents to more than two. 
II.   ACQUISITION OF PARENTAL STATUS AS PROPERTY 
 There is a deep assumption—underlined by strong rules of par-
entage, such as the biological relationship and the marital presump-
tion—that biological parents are natural parents, and any other rules 
of parentage are the operation of law. This is understandable, as the 
default presumption (that the legal mother and father of a child will 
be the woman who gives birth to the child and that woman’s hus-
band) was universally adopted in state law.12 This default presump-
tion matches the historically most common model of parentage,13 
where state intervention is least likely and therefore most invisible.14 
Indeed, in most families, the determination of legal parentage is not 
disputed.15 This understanding of natural parents as real or inherent 
parents “view[s] parentage statutes as recognizing an inherent rela-
 12. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives, Which Came First the Parent or the 
Child?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 318-19 (2010). 
 13. Children born to married parents may soon be the minority of births: in 2008, 
forty-one percent of children were born to unmarried parents. Hannah Alsgaard, Decou-
pling Marriage & Procreation: A Feminist Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, 27 BERKELEY 
J. GENDER L. & JUST. 307, 308-09 (2012). 
 14. See Byrn & Ives, supra note 12, at 318. 
 15. Emily Buss, Essay, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 650 (2002). 
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tionship between an adult and a child, or as a means of guaranteeing 
an adult's pre-existing constitutional right to raise a child.”16  
 Reliance on an inherent natural right of parenthood is uncompli-
cated, and much of the time it is an accurate heuristic. The vast ma-
jority of the time, parentage law invisibly supports uncomplicated 
relationships: a baby is born at a hospital to a woman whose male 
partner is on hand and joyfully identifies himself as father. In such a 
context, parental status is not contested, and there is no formal legal 
proceeding to adjudicate paternity. Even though there is no proceed-
ing to formalize the status of the assumed mother and father, howev-
er, the roles come with significant legal freight.  
 Once the status of legal parent is recognized, it is a profoundly 
powerful position. The legal rights of parenting, often summarized as 
“care, custody, and control” over one’s children, were described by 
Justice O’Connor in Troxel v. Granville as “perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”17 Vindication 
of the rights of parents to decide how to raise their children, even if 
their decisions ran counter to community preferences, formed the 
first seeds of the fundamental rights later explicitly protected in the 
Court’s right-to-privacy jurisprudence.18  
 A key element of the care, custody, and control of one’s children is 
the ability to exclude—a parent may choose what people are not al-
lowed around their children. This parental right is particularly sig-
nificant in the context of disputes regarding other people who might 
function or even see themselves as parents. Troxel presented the ex-
ample of grandparents seeking to continue visits with their grand-
child against the wishes of one parent.19 The case arose after Tommie 
Granville and Brad Troxel, who had two children together, broke 
up.20 Troxel moved in with his parents and regularly brought his 
daughters home with him on the weekends.21 After Troxel’s suicide, 
Granville began to decrease the frequency of visits between the chil-
dren and their paternal grandparents.22 After unsuccessfully appeal-
ing to Granville, the grandparents filed a lawsuit under a Washing-
 16. Byrn & Ives, supra note 12, at 308. 
 17. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 18. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that a 
statute requiring public school enrollment unconstitutionally and “unreasonably inter-
fere[d] with the liberty of parents . . . to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control”); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (holding 
that a statute barring foreign language instruction unconstitutionally violated parents’ 
liberty interests). 
 19. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61. 
 20. Id. at 60. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 60-61.  
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ton statute allowing “ ‘[a]ny person’ ” to petition state courts for visit-
ation rights, which could be granted “ ‘when visitation may serve the 
best interest of the child.’ ”23 For obvious reasons, the Troxels were a 
sympathetic pair: they had helped their son care for the children, had 
built a close relationship with the children through regular visits 
over a period of years, and undoubtedly the love they already felt for 
the girls was magnified by the tragic loss of their son. From the per-
spective of the children, moreover, the Washington Superior Court 
found that it was in the daughters’ best interests that the court order 
substantial visitation with their grandparents.24 After a series of ap-
peals, however, the Supreme Court held that the court order “uncon-
stitutional[ly] infring[ed] on Granville’s fundamental right to make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her [chil-
dren].”25 So long as a legal parent has not been found to be unfit, 
therefore, his or her decisions regarding other adults allowed to have 
contact with the child cannot be second-guessed by a court, even if 
the court finds that the legal parent’s decisions are not in the best 
interest of the child. 
 The impact of strong parental rights in determinations of parent-
age is thus large, as the legal parent has the constitutional ability to 
shut other potential parents out of the child’s life. For example, what 
if the husband of a woman who gives birth and believes at the time 
that the child is his biological child later finds out that is not the 
case? What if a second man comes to the hospital and identifies him-
self as the sperm donor? What if five years later, the mother’s boy-
friend who has helped to raise the child wants his relationship legally 
recognized? In all three examples, the mother’s role as legal parent is 
unchallenged, but the three men—who in two examples already have 
a parental relationship with the child—are in more precarious posi-
tions. Moreover, a court confronted with such cases cannot, perverse 
as it may seem, begin to resolve the dispute by asking what result is 
in the best interest of the child. As explained above, evaluations of 
the best interest of the child are, as a constitutional matter, set aside 
in favor of the decisions of a legal parent who has not been found to 
be unfit. In disputes as to parentage, courts must therefore resolve 
legal parentage first, regardless of whether it would be better for the 
child to remain in the care of a third party.26 
 23. Id. at 61 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)). 
 24. It is worth making clear that Granville did not seek to terminate visitation alto-
gether. The grandparents requested that the children stay with them for two weekends per 
month plus two weeks each summer. Granville proposed one day per month. The Superior 
Court ordered one weekend per month, one week each summer, plus a four-hour visit on 
the grandparents’ birthdays. Id. 
 25. Id. at 72. 
 26. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biolo-
gy as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 363 (1991). 
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 To the extent that the interests of the child are considered in such 
disputes, therefore, they are taken into account only in unspoken   
assumptions that the persons identified by the law as legal parents 
are the persons who will be the best caretakers for the child.27 Par-
entage statutes, however, do not give explanations of why certain 
people will do a good job in that role. Such judgments rely on unspo-
ken assumptions regarding how parental status is generated. In oth-
er words, parentage laws “implicitly appeal to some preanalytic con-
cept of parenthood.”28 These preanalytic concepts of parenthood, 
however, have been left relatively unexplored. For example, although 
most people would agree that a biological relationship generates pa-
rental status, it is unclear what the justification or theory behind 
that belief is.29  
 To begin to answer this question, one can look to the parent-child 
relationship more broadly—to what other legal relationships might it 
be compared? One common comparison in the relationship of parent 
to child is to a property right: that is my child, just as that is my 
house. Treating children as property in everyday life now seems ar-
chaic, which is accurate in the sense that the analogy’s accuracy im-
proves as analysis moves backward in time. To cherry pick an an-
cient and extreme example, in England during the tenth century, fa-
thers could legally kill children who were young enough to exclusive-
ly breastfeed and were free to sell children younger than seven years 
old into slavery.30 Although such literal control over life and death 
was no longer considered part of the parent’s bundle of sticks past 
the tenth century, children were still viewed as valuable assets that 
their fathers had the right to control—“children as chattel.”31 Fa-
thers—at this point in time, the law pointedly excluded mothers from 
legal parental power—had a right to absolute control over their chil-
dren.32 In this notion of parenthood, children were an integral part of 
the family unit’s subsistence, particularly in preindustrial American 
society when the labor of one’s children was necessary for a family’s 
 27. See Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J. L. 
& FEM. 210, 217-19 (2012). 
 28. Id. at 360. 
 29. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 323 (2004); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the 
Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1011, 1022-25 (2003). 
 30. See Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests 
of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 209 
(1978). 
 31. See Marvin R. Ventrell, Essay, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child 
Client Relationship, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 261 (1995). 
 32. See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 167-68 (1992). 
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self-sufficiency.33 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse traced this view 
through Supreme Court privacy doctrine in her seminal article Who 
Owns the Child?34 In her reading, early cases dealing with the right 
to privacy as based in the family were animated by, among other 
things, “a conservative attachment to the patriarchal family, to a 
class-stratified society, and to a parent’s private property rights in 
his children and their labor.”35  
 Obviously, such analogies between a parent’s rights over his or 
her children and an adult’s control over property have declined, rec-
ognizing competing claims to children as a public good and, more im-
portantly, viewing children as individual rights holders.36 Modern 
comparisons are much more attenuated, such as Kevin Maillard’s 
proposal of a stewardship model of parentage, using “the complexities 
of nontitled claims to property” to provide guidance for “the conflict of 
parental rights and children’s best interests.”37 Katharine Baker pro-
posed that the relationship between mother and child should be un-
derstood as modeled on property rights in order to give mothers 
greater power.38 Other updated parallels include children as intellec-
tual property39 and conceptions of property specific to family law, 
such as community property.40 Some vestiges remain, however, par-
ticularly in comparing parents’ rights to a property owner’s right to 
exclude, as discussed above.41  
 The right to treat one’s children as property, however, presuppos-
es an important determination: who the parents are. An analogy to 
property illuminates not only a parent’s rights over his or her chil-
dren, but also why an adult is identified as the child’s parent. Inter-
 33. See, e.g., MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: 
THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994). 
 34. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the 
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992). 
 35. Id. at 997. 
 36. Id. at 1068.  
 37. Kevin Noble Maillard, Rethinking Children as Property: The Transitive Family, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 229 (2010). 
 38. Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by 
Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1528 (1998). 
 39. See, e.g., Merry Jean Chan, Note, The Authorial Parent: An Intellectual Property 
Model of Parental Rights, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186 (2003). 
 40. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Myers, Are Children Community Property in California?, 16 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 65 (2007). 
 41. Carter Dillard, Future Children as Property, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 47, 67 
(2010) (citing Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and 
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL. L. REV. 959, 988 (2009)); see also Felix S. 
Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 370-71 (1954) (“[L]et us put 
this down as one more point of agreement in our analysis of the meaning of private proper-
ty. Private property may or may not involve a right to use something oneself. It may or 
may not involve a right to sell, but whatever else it involves, it must at least involve a right 
to exclude others from doing something.”). 
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estingly, the property analogy not only holds up in examining acqui-
sition of parental rights, but it helps to illuminate one of the major 
shifts in parentage law in recent decades: the increasing strength of 
functional theories of parenthood. Finally, the property analogy high-
lights a growing emphasis on greater claims to the child created 
through gestational labor. 
A.   Parental Status as Bodily Unity 
 Historically, parenthood was the sole product of biology, or at least 
the legal fiction of biology. The plainest explanation of this view is 
that genetic material contributed to a child creates a property claim 
to that child. Intuitively, it seems obvious that the first logical par-
ents should be the biological parents; in a world before complications 
such as in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), sperm donation, or even blended 
families were recognized in law, surely the clearest answer to a ques-
tion of parentage would be the woman who gave birth to the child 
and that woman’s husband. This “easiest-to-identify” answer would 
seem to privilege the gestational mother, and yet, in actuality, par-
entage was explained by analogizing the child as biological property 
of the father.42 For hundreds of years, children were seen as an ex-
tension of their father’s body. As Woodhouse explained, 
The notion of the child as property is at least as ancient as the 
Greek and Judeo Christian traditions identifying man as the pro-
creative force. Consider scripture: God created Eve from Adam’s 
rib, blessed Abraham’s seed, and required male circumcision as a 
primary symbol of the covenant. The patriarchs, and not the ma-
triarchs, begat sons who themselves begat sons. . . . Aristotle be-
lieved the child was a parent’s possession because it came physi-
cally from the parent, like a tooth or a lock of hair. In Aristotle’s 
cosmology, it was the male seed, more divine than the base matter 
contributed by the female, that gave the child its life. . . . In order 
to increase their dynastic wealth, men appropriated “as property, 
the product of the reproductive capacity of subordinate women—
children, to be worked, traded, married off, or sold as slaves, as the 
case might be.”43 
Children—as “flesh of the parent’s flesh”44—were seen as a literal 
extension of their father. His status as parent was thus a fact of na-
ture, justified by the unity of their bodies. 
 Although family structures were based in part upon the voluntary 
marital relationship, and actual biological relationships between fa-
 42. Woodhouse, supra note 34, at 1043. 
 43. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 
215 (1986)). 
 44. Id. at 1044. 
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thers and children could not be determined with certainty, the family 
was seen as “resulting from and reflecting what were understood as 
objective facts of nature.”45 These objective facts of nature were what 
set the home aside from the larger world: family and hearth as a sin-
gle entity within society.46 
 The genetic explanation, however, was demonstrably incomplete 
as medical knowledge advanced. One view of human reproduction 
was that a homunculus, or a tiny but completely formed person, ex-
isted in gametes.47 Once pregnancy began, the homunculus was de-
veloping into the fully-formed baby.48 The only medical question, there-
fore, was in which gamete the homunculus existed, egg or sperm.49  
 As medicine advanced to acknowledge that both biological parents 
contributed genetic material to the child, however, the law did not 
follow suit. The equal contributions of both parents did not create 
equal legal rights in the mother and father. The reason was simple: 
the father, as long as he was married to the mother, already owned 
any contribution that she made.50 Under the doctrine of coverture, 
adopted from the English common law, “the husband and wife are 
one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the 
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated 
and consolidated into that of the husband.”51 Any and all parental 
rights, therefore, were held solely by the father.52 
B.   The Growth of Labor-Based Theories 
 In recent years, however, reliance on bodily unity has been sup-
planted by growing recognition of parentage as generated by the per-
formance of caretaking work for a child. This parentage right is no 
longer a product of biology or a natural inheritance, but the product 
of labor. Parentage, thus, is understood as the product of a Lockean 
labor interest.  
 A very simplified summary of John Locke’s theory of property is 
that ownership of property is created and is justified by the labor 
 45. Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON L. 
REV. 347, 352 (2008). 
 46. See id. at 354. 
 47. See Kara W. Swanson, Adultery by Doctor: Artificial Insemination, 1890-1945, 87 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 591, 597 & n.31 (2012). 
 48. See id. at 597. 
 49. See id. at 597-98 & n.31. 
 50. See Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law, Pluralism, and Human Rights, 25 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 811, 817 (2011). 
 51. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442 (photo. 
reprint 1978) (London, W. Strahan; T. Cadell; & Oxford, D. Prince, 9th ed. 1783) (1765) 
(footnote omitted). 
 52. Estin, supra note 50, at 817. 
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that the owner invested into the property.53 Notably, this theory is 
cleanest as Locke first advanced it, when the property in question 
was first a natural resource unclaimed by any other individual per-
son, and by virtue of investing labor, the owner claimed it for his own 
private property—a comparison that does not seem to track particu-
larly well onto children and parents.54 The analogy is nonetheless 
useful as a tool to summarize several aspects of how legal and socie-
tal understandings of the family have changed.  
 First, as discussed above, in some ways children can be regarded 
as a public good—indeed, as Barbara Bennett Woodhouse pointed 
out, one of the arguments that chipped away at a father’s absolute 
rights over his children was to recognize children as a public good.55 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged some forms of public interest 
in children, acknowledging that a Native American “tribe has an in-
terest in the child which is distinct from but on a parity with the in-
terest of the parents.”56 Although there is not a literal natural supply 
of unclaimed children, in some senses children could be regarded as 
an undeveloped resource. Viewing childrearing as investing labor and 
money into a resource, and thus generating a claim to that resource, 
puts a more precise explanation and name to existing justifications of 
parents’ rights.57 
 Second, the great strength of using Locke’s theory in the context of 
acquiring parental status is in recognizing the value of the labor in-
vested into property, as it is recognition of parental labor (as opposed 
to the natural right of bodily unity) that underlies the evolution of 
modern family law. As Anupam Chander explains, 
For Locke, the major part of the value of a thing arises from hu-
man endeavor, not from the thing’s natural state of being. Deriv-
 53. See JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 19 (Charles L. Sherman ed., D. Appleton-Century Co. 1937) (1689) (“Whatso-
ever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath 
mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property.” (emphasis added)). 
 54.  Locke also acknowledged in his Second Treatise that “paternal power” appears to 
place all parental power in the hands of the father, where the mother should have equal 
power over the child. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 146 (Thomas I. Cook 
ed., Hafner Pub. Co. 6th prtg. 1965) (1690). 
 55. See Woodhouse, supra note 34, at 1068. 
  56.  Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52 (1989) (quoting 
In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969 (Utah 1986). Notably, the Court also quoted 
language from the Utah Supreme Court’s decision noting that the relationship between 
tribe and children raised on a tribal reservation “finds no parallel” in other cultures. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Cynthia A. McNeely, Comment, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, 
Custody, and Gender Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 897 (1998) 
(“Courts, during a time when the culture was agrarian and children worked in the fields, 
upheld this action by finding that the father’s financial support of his children entitled him 
to the benefits of their labor.”). 
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ing property rights from labor becomes more intuitively appealing 
if one believes that it is the labor itself that gave the worked-upon 
object its value. It is this belief that leads Locke’s theory to be 
characterized as one of moral desert: the law grants a person a 
property right in a thing because that person deserves it as a re-
ward for the virtue of having created the major part of its value.58 
 Focusing on the value of a parent’s investment thus strengthens 
the analogy considerably. The recognition of parental labor—often in 
practice maternal labor—has driven some of the most extensive mod-
ern reforms to parentage law.  
 The shift first appeared in the context of custody disputes. Custo-
dy disputes generally weigh competing claims brought by two legal 
parents, typically the mother and father. It is not, therefore, an iden-
tification of parents. Because custody disputes in effect determine 
many of the tangible rights of parenthood, however, they help to    
illuminate who a child’s “real,” or more active, parent is seen to be 
and why.59  
 Historically, under the property-as-bodily-unity analogy discussed 
above, fathers not only had near complete power over children as a 
right in intact families,60 but they also had the right to have their 
children with them.61 A Massachusetts case from 1834 stated quite 
plainly that “in general, . . . the father is by law clearly entitled to the 
custody of his child.”62  
 The first shift away from a strict rule of father’s dominion in cus-
tody disputes was the tender years doctrine, meaning that young 
children of “tender years” should live with their mother,63 but an old-
er child should be given into the custody of the parent of the child’s 
sex.64 Maine was one of the first jurisdictions to move toward the ten-
 58. Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715, 742 (2003). 
 59. Many divorces involving children never generated a custody dispute because one 
parent, generally the father, did not seek primary custody. To the extent that one might 
draw an explicitly gendered conclusion from the cases that did require judicial interven-
tion, therefore, reported custody cases present a nontypical subset of custody determina-
tions. For purposes of my analysis, however, this does not present a problem: the vast ma-
jority of both custody and parentage disputes are uncontested. The rules used to settle both 
types of disputes are exceptional in use, but important (as I will discuss further below) for 
the purposes of setting defaults and serving expressive or channeling functions. 
 60. Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child 
Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 345 (2008). 
 61. Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Poli-
cymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 111. 
 62. Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203, 205 (1834). 
 63. Fineman & Opie, supra note 61, at 112; Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a 
Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796–1851, 73 
NW. U. L. REV 1038, 1072-73 (1979). 
 64. Fineman & Opie, supra note 61, at 112; see also Zainaldin, supra note 63, at 1073 
(“[W]hen feasible, boys of older age [were required to] be placed in the care of the father.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
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der years doctrine, and the Maine Supreme Court’s analysis concisely 
demonstrates the analytical shift. In State v. Smith, Jonathan Hall 
had drawn up an agreement with his wife stating that “if, in conse-
quence of any ill treatment by him, his wife should be rendered un-
happy and unwilling to cohabit with him,” she would receive custody 
of their three children.65 He later challenged the agreement, arguing 
that as father he had a “paramount right” to the children.66 The court 
disagreed—but its analysis initially seemed to treat the dispute sole-
ly under a contractual disposition of the father’s natural property, 
noting that since fathers had the right to assign the services of their 
children by sending them out as apprentices to learn a trade, Hall 
should be bound by his contract.67 The court then turned, however, to 
the ages of the children, noting that it could not “forget that the eld-
est of these children is a daughter, requiring peculiarly the superin-
tendence of a mother.”68 This focus on the gendered needs of children 
old enough to require modeling of their socially determined sex roles 
exemplifies the tender years doctrine; as Jamil Zainaldin described 
it, “the judiciary’s interpretation of the law of nature.”69  
 The tender years doctrine rose to prominence in Britain the 1840s, 
and by the early twentieth century, most American courts had adopt-
ed some form of the doctrine, which held sway in most states’ custody 
laws until the late 1960s.70 The doctrine, although it granted greater 
preeminence to the nurturing, caretaking work performed by women, 
still rested in part on biology: mothers were judged the appropriate 
custodians of younger children due in large part to assumptions that 
mothers were better and more nurturing caretakers, but the assump-
tions in turn were justified by stereotypes about sex roles.71  
 In the middle of the twentieth century, the focus turned from the 
sex roles of the parents to the psychological well-being of the child as 
 65. State v. Smith, 6 Me. 462, 463 (1830) (quotation marks omitted). 
 66. Id. at 464. 
 67. Id. at 465. 
 68. Id. at 468. 
 69. Zainaldin, supra note 63, at  1070. 
 70. See Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of the 
Tender Years Doctrine, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 769, 774 (2004); see also Gary Crippen, Stum-
bling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in 
the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 427, 433-34 (1990); Sanford N. Katz, “That They May Thrive” Goal of Child 
Custody: Reflections on the Apparent Erosion of the Tender Years Presumption and the 
Emergence of the Primary Caretaker Presumption, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 123, 
126-28 (1992); Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. 
FAM. L. 423, 429 (1976). As will be discussed further below, although the tender years doc-
trine is no longer formally used in custody determinations, some studies indicate that in 
practice, assumptions about the relative nurturing skills and instincts of men and women 
largely replicate the doctrine’s effect. See, e.g., Artis, supra, at 783-85. 
 71. See Artis, supra note 70, at 784-85. 
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formed in large part by caretaking labor. Attachment theory, as ad-
vocated by child psychologists, explained that a child’s interactions 
with the person responsible for the bulk of the everyday caregiving 
work created a strong emotional and psychological bond.72 This at-
tachment was “the essential cornerstone for a child’s healthy emo-
tional development,”73 and a child separated from the person to 
whom she had formed such an attachment would suffer severe and 
permanent psychological trauma.74   
 Attachment theory laid the groundwork for the primary caretaker 
standard or factor in custody determinations. The primary caretaker 
standard directed a court to assess the caretaking labor in order to 
identify one parent as the primary caretaker of the child.75 A West 
Virginia case explaining the standard summarized specific daily 
tasks to be considered:  
(1) [P]reparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and 
dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical 
care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for 
social interaction among peers after school . . . ; (6) arranging       
alternative care, i. e. babysitting . . . ; (7) putting child to bed at 
night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in 
the morning; (8) disciplining, i. e. teaching general manners       
and toilet training; (9) educating, i. e. religious, cultural, social, 
etc.; and, (10) teaching elementary skills, i. e. reading, writing      
and arithmetic.76  
Although the primary caretaker standard was justified by concepts 
from attachment theory protecting a close parent/child bond, the 
caretaking parent had to prove that he or she created the bond 
through his or her daily labor.77 Use of the primary caretaker stand-
ard to identify a single primary caretaker and award custody to that 
parent was only temporarily applied in West Virginia and Minneso-
ta.78 Identification of the primary caretaker, however, remains as one 
factor—albeit not a dispositive one—to be considered in custody de-
terminations in many states.79  
 72. See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in 
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 528-30 (1984). 
 73. Id. at 529. 
 74. Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent Theo-
ry, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 347, 347 (1996).  
 75. See Crippen, supra note 70, at 434-35. 
 76. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981). 
 77. See Crippen, supra note 70, at 439-42. 
 78. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law: 
Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 48-49 (2008); see also Becker, 
supra note 32, at 171 & n.148; Crippen, supra note 70, at 428-29. 
 79. See Alexandra Selfridge, Equal Protection and Gender Preference in Divorce Con-
tests over Custody, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 172 (2007). 
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 The move toward recognition of parental labor has had greater 
effect in the context of parentage determinations. The primary care-
taker standard and attachment theory arose as part of custody de-
terminations, identifying which parent would be a better physical 
custodian for a child.80 Functional theories of parentage, by contrast, 
use the same assessment of caretaking labor to define parenthood 
itself, and consequently use labor as a test to identify legal parents. 
For example, in a 2000 case from New Jersey, a lesbian couple start-
ed a family through the artificial insemination of one of the women.81 
When the resulting twins were two years old, the women broke up, 
and the woman with no genetic link to the children asked for visita-
tion.82 The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a test for “psychologi-
cal parenthood,” requiring that “the legal parent must consent to and 
foster the relationship between the third party and the child; the 
third party must have lived with the child; the third party must per-
form parental functions for the child to a significant degree; and most 
important, a parent-child bond must be forged.”83 The court noted 
that the nonbiological mother in the case had “labored alongside” the 
biological mother in performing caretaking work and thereby created 
an emotional bond with the children.84 This labor itself created her 
status as psychological parent.85 
 Importantly, functional theories do not necessarily create status 
as legal parent: as in the New Jersey case, functional theories some-
times merely give the adult some legal standing to request visitation 
or custody that is nonetheless subordinate to status as legal parent.86 
Such theories have been gaining in strength in recent decades, how-
ever, and have increasing applicability in multiple contexts.87 Nancy 
Polikoff has written extensively advocating for functional theories of 
parentage, particularly in the context of same-sex couple parents, 
proposing “expanding the definition of parenthood to include anyone 
who maintains a functional parental relationship with a child when a 
legally recognized parent created that relationship with the intent 
 80. See, e.g., Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 361 (“[W]e are convinced that the best interests of 
the children are best served in awarding them to the primary caretaker parent, regardless 
of sex.”). 
 81. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 2000). 
 82. Id. at 544. 
 83. Id. at 551-52. 
 84. Id. at 550. 
 85. Id. at 555. 
 86. See Purvis, supra note 27, at 226-27. 
 87. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: 
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 879 (1984); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: 
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341 (2002). 
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that the relationship be parental in nature.”88 Functional theories 
have had considerable influence in the context of paternity disestab-
lishment, meaning a man discovers that a child he believed was his 
biological child is not. Under theories of “equitable parenthood,” such 
a father is entitled to protect his status as legal parent notwithstand-
ing the lack of a genetic link, by virtue of the relationship he created 
with the child.89 Should the father be the one seeking to terminate 
his status as legal parent, states are mixed as to whether he is al-
lowed to do so—several jurisdictions lock in legal fathers even if the 
labor they put in as father was effectively the product of fraud.90 
Functional theories have also been proposed as a way to unbundle 
some of the rights and duties attendant with status as legal parent, 
such as inheritance rights.91 
 One of the modern strands of functional theories turns to the bodi-
ly labor of women. Historical recognition of pregnant women as 
mothers was expressed as mater est quam gestation demonstrat, or 
“by gestation the mother is demonstrated.”92 Until recently, this was 
also a reiteration of the reliance on genetic link as generating 
parenthood. Today, however, with the advent of gestational surroga-
cy, in which an embryo is implanted into the uterus of a surrogate who 
carries the pregnancy to term, the assumption no longer holds true. 
 Even outside the context of surrogacy, multiple scholars explain 
parental rights as justified by the labor of the pregnant woman. 
Katharine Baker, for example, notes that a mother’s de facto control 
over her child “suggests that the gestational mother gains parental 
status through her gestational investment, not through her genetic 
contribution.”93 Jennifer Hendricks applauds the Supreme Court for 
refusing to “ignore[] any uniquely female experience and define[] 
parenthood as genetic contribution, giving biological fathers equal 
 88. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to 
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. 
L.J. 459, 464 (1990). 
 89. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). 
 90. See Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Pater-
nity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 837-43 (2006) [hereinafter Jacobs, My Two Dads]; Melanie B. 
Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn’t Want to Be Daddy Anymore: An Argument Against Paternity 
Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193 (2004) [hereinafter Jacobs, An Argument 
Against Paternity Fraud Claims]. 
 91. E. Gary Spitko, Open Adoption, Inheritance, and the “Uncleing” Principle, 48 SAN-
TA CLARA L. REV. 765, 767 (2008) (“[T]he article proposes reforming intestacy statutes to 
allow an adopted child and her birth parent who have maintained a ‘qualifying functional 
relationship’ following an open adoption to inherit from and through each other as would 
an aunt or uncle and a niece or nephew.”). 
 92. Hill, supra note 26, at 370. 
 93. Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity 
Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 47 (2004). 
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rights with biological mothers.”94 In her reading, the Supreme Court 
was correct to refuse to grant status as legal parent to an unwed bio-
logical father who did not have a relationship with his child because 
to do so would “reinforce the notion that biological fathers ‘own’ their 
offspring regardless of whether they have functioned as parents.”95 E. 
Gary Spitko explains that a “biological mother’s constitutional paren-
tal rights arise . . . from her role nourishing the child in her womb 
and enduring the pain and danger of childbirth,”96 and proposes col-
lapsing biological relationships into functional theories by recogniz-
ing the parentage of biological fathers only if the biological mother 
consents to the relationship.97 Spitko rests his argument explicitly on 
the value of parental labor:  
 The biological father is situated dramatically differently from 
the biological mother with respect to the labor necessary for the 
child’s birth. The biological father’s role in conceiving the child is 
constitutionally insignificant as labor. He has no role, of course, in 
physically carrying and giving birth to the child. He does not quali-
fy, therefore, for automatic constitutional protection under the la-
bor-with-consent theory of constitutional parental rights.98 
 Parentage as labor has thus gained ground over parentage as bod-
ily unity, but this is not to say that one theory has replaced the other. 
An interesting consequence of the growing strength of parentage as 
labor is in shifting justifications for existing doctrine. One example, 
to which the next section turns, is the marital presumption. 
C.   Case Study: The Marital Presumption 
 The marital presumption creates a rule of legal parentage that 
when a married woman gives birth, her husband is presumed to be 
the legal father of the child. The presumption was historically a rigid 
rule, but it has weakened in recent decades.99 Although almost half of 
U.S. states still have some form of the presumption in their laws, it is 
generally employed as a relatively weak rebuttable presumption, ra-
ther than an ironclad rule.100 
 94. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 
451 (2007). 
 95. See id. at 452-53 (criticizing the application by lower courts of Supreme Court 
cases addressing the rights of unwed biological fathers).  
 96. E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of 
the Biological Mother’s Consent to the Biological Father’s Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 97, 99 (2006). 
 97. Id. at 100-05. 
 98. Id. at 109 (footnotes omitted). 
 99. Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legiti-
macy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 228 (2006). 
 100. Id. at 234-36. 
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 The justifications offered for the marital presumption have under-
gone a progression from a focus on parentage justified by biology to 
parentage justified by labor. Historically, the marital presumption 
codified an assumed biological link.101 Long before paternity tests 
were available, in other words, the marital presumption assumed 
that married women did not bear children fathered by men other 
than their husbands.102 At times, this assumption approached the 
level of willful blindness: in England, the marital presumption could 
only be overcome if the husband was “beyond the four seas” during 
the time in which a child was conceived, proving by physical impossi-
bility that he was not the child’s biological father.103 Evidentiary      
bars went even further, barring the spouses themselves from testify-
ing as to the husband’s presence in the home during the time of 
probable conception.104 
 The marital presumption began, therefore, as a legal fiction of bio-
logical link—a legal fiction that was no doubt in most cases actually 
true.105 But to the extent that the presumption legally codified biolog-
ical bonds that did not actually exist—perhaps that the fathers occa-
sionally knew did not exist—what purpose did the presumption 
serve? In an era when illegitimate children suffered explicit discrim-
ination and a woman’s worth was set by her sexual morality,106 con-
cerns for the individual people involved cannot be dismissed. But an-
other purpose served was to provide legal protection for family rela-
tionships that already existed: if the husband was willing to continue 
living with his wife and providing for his family, the familial rela-
tionships should be legally protected.107 
 Modern discussions of the marital presumption have elucidated 
this point. A California appeals court, discussing California’s conclu-
sive marital presumption of parentage, noted that initially, the law 
was justified “on the ground that no competent evidence could be ad-
duced to indicate who among those who had had intercourse with the 
 101. See David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, 
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 130 (2006). 
 102. See Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation 
of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 527 (2000) (describing the presumption as 
“elid[ing] the biological facts in an era in which they were unknowable”). 
 103. Meyer, supra note 101, at 127. 
 104. Appleton, supra note 100, at 232-33. 
 105. See Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 
UTAH L. REV. 461, 463 (“At common law, marriage was the defining criterion for a man to 
be recognized as a child’s legal parent. However, in practice the law also protected func-
tional and biological family relationships because adults rarely lived together openly as 
mates without being married, and unwed parenthood was strongly socially disapproved, at 
least within the social groups whose mores were dominant.”) 
 106. See Johanna Bond, Honor as Property, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 202, 205, 211 
(2012). 
 107. See Harris, supra note 105, at 463-64. 
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wife during the period of possible conception was the biological father 
of the child born to her.”108 The California state legislature later justi-
fied the “conclusive presumption fiction” on three grounds: “(1) 
preservation of the integrity of the family; (2) protection of the inno-
cent child from the social stigma of illegitimacy; and (3) a desire        
to have an individual rather than the state assume the financial bur-
den of supporting the child.”109 The court then noted that the legisla-
ture amended the law to admit some blood tests disproving paternity, 
but with strict limits that only the husband could introduce such 
tests and only within the first two years of the child’s life.110 The     
explanation, the court speculated, was “probably found” in an article 
in the Stanford Law Review, and quoted what it believed was the   
key reasoning: 
“[I]n the case of an older child the familial relationship between 
the child and the man purporting to be the child’s father is consid-
erably more palpable than the biological relationship of actual pa-
ternity. A man who has lived with a child, treating it as his son or 
daughter, has developed a relationship with the child that should 
not be lightly dissolved and upon which liability for continued re-
sponsibility to the child might be predicated. This social relation-
ship is much more important, to the child at least, than a biologi-
cal relationship of actual paternity.”111 
The work put in by the husband, the parenting labor creating a rela-
tionship, thus justified the legal protection. 
 This is not to say that labor-based theories of the acquisition of 
parental status have entirely replaced bodily unity as a theory of how 
parental status is created. The growing dominance of a labor-based 
theory of the acquisition of parenthood, however, helps to explain a 
web of parentage rules that seem at first blush to be in conflict: the 
laws governing fatherhood. 
III.   FATHERHOOD AS LABOR 
 The law creates a curious contrast in defining who is a father. In 
the context of child support, a biological connection is all that is 
needed to trigger, if exercised, an obligation to pay child support for 
the duration of the child’s minority.112 In other contexts, however, a 
 108. Stephen B. v. Sharyne Sue B. (In re Marriage of Stephen & Sharyne B.), 177 Cal. 
Rptr. 429, 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
 109. Id. at 432. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 432-33 (quoting William P. Hoffman, Jr., Recent Developments, California’s 
Tangled Web: Blood Tests and the Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy, 20 STAN. L. REV. 
754, 761 (1968)). 
 112. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 347, 366 (2012). 
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biological father who is not married to the biological mother is not 
viewed as the legal father of the child, even where he strenuously 
seeks that status. Unwed biological fathers are, at least in some con-
texts, locked both in and out of parenthood by the law. 
 The move from bodily unity to labor helps to explain this. The 
male property “interest” in his genetic material is locked in once ges-
tational labor begins. This interest is necessary for parental status, 
but not yet sufficient—in order for him to claim his status as legal 
parent, he has to contribute parental labor.  
A.   Where Fathers Are Locked In 
 In the words of June Carbone and Naomi Cahn, while “[s]hotgun 
marriage may be dead; shotgun parenthood is not.”113 Child support 
is one of the largest obligations—in duration, amount, and strength—
imposed by the law. It foists the fiscal duties of parenthood upon 
people, mostly men, regardless of whether they desire to be a parent.  
 Child support is premised in almost all circumstances on biologi-
cal link.114 The obligation is so strong that even in extreme examples 
where crimes were committed in the conception of the child, the vic-
tim is nonetheless responsible for fiscal support of his biological child.  
 Multiple men have attempted to argue that they were defrauded 
by women who lied about the possibility of their becoming pregnant. 
In one Michigan case, a biological father argued that he had express-
ly told the biological mother that he did not want to be a father and 
was assured that not only was the woman using contraceptives, but 
also that she was infertile.115 The father brought a suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the Michigan Paternity Act violated the 
Federal Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause “by denying men, but 
not women, ‘the right to initiate [sic] consensual sexual activity while 
choosing not to be a parent.’ ”116 This argument was roundly reject-
ed.117 Another unwilling father, Peter Wallis, faced similar facts: he 
claimed that he had discussed with his sexual partner his desire not 
to father a child and was assured that she was taking birth control 
pills.118 She stopped taking birth control pills but did not inform Wal-
lis.119 Wallis did not seek to terminate his child support obligation but 
 113. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 29, at 1025. 
 114. Susan Frelich Appleton draws upon the explanations of child support to argue 
that child support is one method that the state uses to control (and tax) heterosexual inter-
course. See Appleton, supra note 112, at 366-67.   
 115. Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 116. Id. at 427-30 (quoting Appellant’s Final Brief on Appeal at 11, Dubay v. Wells, 506 
F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-2107), 2007 WL 2735358, at *11). 
 117. Id. at 430. 
 118. Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). 
 119. Id.  
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sought compensatory and punitive damages from the mother on the 
basis of fraud, breach of contract, tort (measuring damages by the 
cost of raising a child), and most creatively, conversion—“purloined 
sperm,” as one commentator described it.120 Again, the father’s claims 
were rejected, citing the state legislature’s “public policy that governs 
the economic consequences of sexual relationships that produce chil-
dren, . . . reflected in [the state’s] child support laws.”121 Finding that 
it was “self-evident” that Wallis was attempting to avoid paying child 
support, the court explained that public policy established strict lia-
bility for the “financial responsibility of [a] child.”122  
 Even more extreme allegations regarding fraud as part of sexual 
activity have been made in litigation. More than one reported case 
rested on claims that the couple did not actually have sexual inter-
course.123 The man in each case asserted that he had only engaged in 
oral sex with a woman who had then artificially inseminated her-
self.124 Admittedly, these claims may be too bizarre to be believed—
and one claim was indeed rejected on the merits, despite testimony 
from a witness who had walked in on the alleged self-insemination in 
a bathroom.125 In a 2005 Illinois case, however, the father’s claims of 
fraudulent misrepresentation and conversion were dismissed as fail-
ing to state a cause of action.126 In other words, the court, for the 
purposes of evaluating the motion to dismiss, assumed his factual 
allegations to be true and concluded that even if his account was ac-
curate he was nonetheless still liable for child support.127 (The court 
did allow a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress to move 
forward.128) The dismissal of these claims is typical. Although a number   
 120. Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 COR-
NELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 52 (2003) (citing Wallis, 22 P.3d at 683). 
 121. Wallis, 22 P.3d at 684. 
 122. Id. at 683-84. 
 123. See, e.g., Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Feb. 22, 2005); State v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
 124. See, e.g., Phillips, 2005 WL 4694579, at *1; Frisard, 694 So. 2d at 1035. 
 125. Frisard, 694 So. 2d at 1035. 
 126. Phillips, 2005 WL 4694579, at *5-6. Entertainingly, although the court noted that 
other jurisdictions had recognized a “property right” in body materials, it rejected the 
man’s conversion claim with the reasoning that he could not “show he had the ‘right to 
immediate, absolute, and unconditional possession’ of his sperm. Plaintiff presumably in-
tended, and he does not claim otherwise, that defendant discard his semen, not return it to 
him.” Id. at *6. 
 127. Although Phillips’s arguments followed the model of Peter Wallis and did not ex-
plicitly challenge his child support obligation, it seems obvious that at least some of the 
damages he hoped to secure would have compensated him for his $800 monthly child sup-
port payment. See Associated Press, Sperm: The ‘Gift’ That Keeps on Giving, 
NBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 24, 2005, 2:39 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7024930/ns/health-
sexual_health/t/sperm-gift-keeps-giving/#.U1L6u1VdWSo.    
 128. Phillips, 2005 WL 4694579, at *5. 
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of cases alleging contraceptive fraud have been attempted,129 even 
where elements of misrepresentation are arguably shown, courts con-
clude that public policy blocks the claims.130 (Arguments that the 
women have refused to mitigate the damages of child support by 
terminating their pregnancies have been similarly unsuccessful.131) 
Interestingly, there is some evidence that the dismissal of unwilling 
fathers’ suits is gendered, as at least some claims brought by women 
seeking reimbursement for the costs of pregnancy or of an abortion 
have been successful.132 
 In any case, claims of fraud in an intimate context raise eviden-
tiary and privacy concerns that might justify refusing to adjudicate 
them. Such concerns are not present, however, in the context of fa-
thers who could not have legally consented to intercourse, and yet 
child support obligations are frequently imposed on such fathers. 
Boys who are victims of statutory rape, for example—whose abusers 
are convicted and in some cases imprisoned for the act—are held lia-
ble for child support.133 Even allegations of the rape of adults are re-
jected as excusing a child support obligation. In an Alabama case, a 
man alleged that the child whose support he was liable for was the 
product of sexual assault.134 He had attended a party at the mother’s 
house and, according to the testimony of many witnesses, had become 
intoxicated to the point of passing out.135 After that night, the mother 
 129. Adrienne D. Gross, Note, A Man’s Right to Choose: Searching for Remedies in the 
Face of Unplanned Fatherhood, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 1015, 1020-21 (2007). 
 130. Id. at 1023 & n.56 (“ ‘The underlying inquiry in this case is whether the injuries 
claimed are in fact actionable. Public policy persuades us that they are not.’ ” (quoting 
Welzenbach v. Powers, 660 A.2d 1133, 1135 (N.H. 1995))). 
 131. Id. at 1027 (“As fault in conception is not relevant to the needs and requirements 
of a child, a father’s claim of fraud cannot be used to mitigate the amount of child support. 
Because most courts do not find there to be actual damages claimed, this argument is of 
little merit. It is impossible to mitigate damages that do not even exist.” (footnotes omit-
ted)). 
 132. See Sarah E. Rudolph, Inequities in the Current Judicial Analysis of Misrepresen-
tation of Fertility Claims, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 331 (arguing that differential treatment of 
misrepresentation of contraceptive use claims is rooted in a perception of women as unable 
to support or protect themselves); cf. Jill E. Evans, In Search of Paternal Equity: A Father’s 
Right to Pursue a Claim of Misrepresentation of Fertility, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045, 1047-
48 (2005) (arguing that although refusal of relief in contraceptive fraud cases is appropri-
ate, the justifications for refusal have thus far been inconsistent). See also M.B.W. Sinclair, 
Seduction and the Myth of the Ideal Woman, 5 LAW & INEQ. 33, 33 (1987) (tracing the evo-
lution of the tort of seduction as tied to the “myth of the ideal woman”); Jill Elaine Hasday, 
Intimate Lies (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 133. See Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male Victims of 
Statutory Rape Pay Child Support for Children Resulting from Their Victimization?, 36 GA. 
L. REV. 411, 411-12 (2002); see also State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 
1278-79 (Kan. 1993) (collecting cases); Stringer v. Dep’t of Human Servs. ex rel. Baker (In 
re Paternity of K.B.), 104 P.3d 1132, 1134-35 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (same). 
  134. S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1187-88 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). 
  135. Id.  
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allegedly told another witness that the mother had sexual inter-
course with the man while he was passed out, and that doing so had 
“saved her a trip to the sperm bank.”136 The court declined to rule on 
whether this account was correct, instead concluding that “any 
wrongful conduct on the part of the mother should not alter the fa-
ther’s duty to provide support for the child.”137 Even if the child was 
the product of rape committed against the father, in other words, the 
child support obligation remained. 
 In short, despite some attempts by scholars to craft a consent-
based model for parenthood, men have virtually no negative procrea-
tional right, at least in the context of biological children.138 Moreover, 
those exceptions to the rule that do exist illuminate the interaction 
between biology and labor. 
B.   Exceptions to the Biological Rule 
 Despite the extremely strong imposition of child support based 
solely on genetic connection, biological fathers in limited circum-
stances can evade legal parentage. One example is straightforward: 
sperm donors, so long as the donation took place in a clinical setting, 
are not legal parents and are not subject to child support obliga-
tions.139 This is the case not only where the mother secures sperm 
from an anonymous donor, but also where she and the donor know 
each other.140 Analogy to property theory provides one explanation, 
that through the clinical context the genetic material has entered 
into commerce. The mother is not, in other words, claiming the child 
by virtue of labor that she invested into material that was otherwise 
in the commons. She owns the genetic material because she paid for 
it—but that payment, even though it is not paid directly to the donor, 
severs all other claims. 
 A second example from the world of assisted reproductive technol-
ogies (“ART”) is less clear-cut. When in vitro fertilization is used,  
embryos are created outside of a woman’s body (colloquially, “test 
tube babies”), and some of the embryos are then implanted into the 
 136. Id. at 1188 (quotation marks omitted). 
 137. Id. at 1189. 
 138. See Michael J. Higdon, Fatherhood by Conscription: Nonconsensual Insemination 
and the Duty of Child Support, 46 GA. L. REV. 407 (2012) (proposing that a consent-based 
model of fatherhood as recognized in the context of artificial insemination be adopted in the 
context of sexual assault); see also Christopher Bruno, Note, A Right to Decide Not to Be a 
Legal Father: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Acceptance of Emotional Harm as a Constitu-
tionally Protected Interest, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 141, 150 (2008) (arguing that “a declara-
tion of legal paternity may violate the father’s right to procreational autonomy”). 
 139. See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1034-35 (Kan. 2007). 
 140. Id.; Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1238 (Pa. 2007). 
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uterus to hopefully be brought to term.141 IVF typically creates more 
embryos than are implanted in a single pregnancy.142 The remaining 
embryos are stored by the fertility clinic so that they will be available 
for use by the parents should they desire more children.143 In the    
interim, however, co-parents occasionally end their relationship     
and disagree about whether and how the remaining embryos will     
be used.144 
 In contrast to the unwilling child support obligors, these biological 
fathers have been successful in claiming that procreative liberty in-
cludes a right to block such embryos from being used. For example, in 
Davis v. Davis, Junior Davis was able to prevent his ex-wife Mary 
Sue Davis from being granted “custody” of seven stored preembry-
os.145 The Tennessee Supreme Court first determined that the 
preembryos were an interim category somewhere between “per-
sons”146 and “property,” in which both Davises had “an interest in the 
nature of ownership.”147 In the absence of agreement between the 
Davises, the court balanced their relative interests and concluded 
that “[o]rdinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should pre-
vail.”148 Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that a 
consent form signed by former spouses giving stored preembryos to 
the wife was unenforceable because “forced procreation is not an area 
amenable to judicial enforcement.”149 
 Again, the property analogy is helpful. In contrast to the tradi-
tional child support claims created through sexual intercourse, at the 
point that preembryos are stored in a fertility clinic’s freezer, the 
mother has not yet contributed any labor to the embryo. Assisted re-
productive technology thus provides a greater window of time in 
which the contributions of both potential parents—genetic material— 
are equal. Because the mother’s gestational labor has not yet begun, 
she does not have a greater claim to the status of parent and the at-
tendant decisionmaking abilities. 
 Interestingly, some criticisms of the embryo storage cases support 
this point. One common argument, which has been acknowledged by 
 141. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Embryo Fundamentalism, 18 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 1015, 1015-16 (2010). 
 142. Id. at 1016. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 1021. 
 145. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589, 604-05 (Tenn. 1992). 
 146. To some extent, as June Carbone and Naomi Cahn point out, this sidesteps ques-
tions about the “moral status” of embryos and preembryos. See Carbone & Cahn, supra 
note 141. 
 147. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
 148. Id. at 604. 
 149. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-58 (Mass. 2000). 
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courts faced with the issue, is that women’s reproductive possibilities 
are limited by biology in a way that men’s are not.150 One limitation 
is time: the usable eggs from a single woman are limited in number 
and decrease in numbers and efficacy as she ages.151 Stored 
preembryos are thus specimens taken from a sharply limited re-
source. Another limitation, however, is the intrusiveness of harvest-
ing eggs from a woman as compared to sperm donation. More than 
one commentator has argued the point that since preembryos exist, 
the potential mother has put labor into the prepregnancy that the po-
tential father has not, and thus she is due more decisional rights over 
the preembryos.152 
 In acknowledging the relative power of genetic mothers and fa-
thers, then, it becomes clear that there is an imbalance in the sense 
that pregnant women, who are contributing bodily labor, have great-
er decisionmaking power than men who are not yet contributing any 
labor. After birth, however, the imbalance continues when the moth-
er and father are unmarried. The next section explains how labor-
based theories of parentage help to illuminate the legal treatment of 
unwed biological fathers. 
C.   Unwed Biological Fathers and the Supreme Court 
 The clearest example of the genesis of fatherhood—an investment 
of genetic material plus later parental labor—is manifested in a line 
of Supreme Court cases dealing with the claims of unwed biological 
fathers to parenthood. As explained above, unwed biological fathers 
are required to create a substantial relationship with their child be-
fore their parental rights and status are constitutionally cognizable. 
The Court’s opinions place emphasis on the importance of an unwed 
father proving his good intentions by contributing time and effort to 
the relationship, highlighting the implicit significance of labor theory 
 150. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (“[W]e conclude that 
Wife’s compelling interests in using the pre-embryos include the fact that these pre-
embryos are the option that provides her with what is likely her only chance at genetic 
parenthood and her most reasonable chance for parenthood at all.”); Davis v. Davis, 842 
S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (“Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should 
prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood 
by means other than use of the preembryos in question. If no other reasonable alternatives 
exist, then the argument in favor of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be 
considered.”). 
 151. See Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm Is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1066 (1996). 
 152. See id. at 1071; Tracey S. Pachman, Disputes Over Frozen Preembryos & the 
“Right Not to Be a Parent,” 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128, 145 (2003) (“Because reproduc-
tion biologically takes place exclusively within a woman’s body, any process that must take 
place outside a woman’s body in the IVF procedure requires considerable contributions by 
the woman.”). 
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in current doctrine.153 Moreover, when the thread of labor is high-
lighted, it becomes clearer that unwed biological fathers have fewer 
paths to legal parenthood available to them than do unwed biological 
mothers, whose parentage is assumed. 
 In Stanley v. Illinois, the first case in which the Court dealt with 
the legal treatment of unwed biological fathers, a father challenged 
an Illinois statute that specified upon the death of a mother of illegit-
imate children, the children were made wards of the state.154 The 
plaintiff, Peter Stanley, had lived with his children and helped to 
raise them for their whole lives, yet the statute gave him no oppor-
tunity to argue that staying in his care was in their best interest.155 
One way to understand the statute’s effect, therefore, was to regard 
all unwed fathers as unfit, which would justify taking Stanley’s chil-
dren away from him.156 
 As an alternative, however, the Court took the view that “Stanley 
[was] treated not as a parent but as a stranger to his children.”157 In 
effect, the statute manifested a “theory that an unwed father is not a 
‘parent’ whose existing relationship with his children must be consid-
ered.”158 The Court therefore held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional, as Stanley was entitled to show that he was not neglectful, 
was an active parent, provided caretaking, and deserved custody.159 
The Court thus found that unwed biological fathers had the right to 
show that they were “real” fathers.160 Importantly, however, the 
Court seemed to have in mind evidence of Stanley’s parental labor    
as the type of evidence that he could present to prove that he had   
parental rights.161 
 Six years later, the Court decided Quilloin v. Walcott, which gave 
voice to the assumption that parental labor was what converted an 
unwed biological father to a legal father.162 The biological father,   
Leon Webster Quilloin, had informally acknowledged his son, and 
although he never lived with the child and biological mother as a 
 153. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 
380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 654-655 (1972). 
 154. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. 
 155. Id. at 646-47.  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 648. 
 158. Id. at 649-50 (emphasis added). 
 159. Id. at 649, 654-55. 
 160. Id. at 657-58. 
 161. See id. at 654-55 (“[N]othing in this record indicates that Stanley is or has been a 
neglectful father who has not cared for his children.”). 
 162. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978). 
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family, he visited and gave gifts to his son.163 He never formally legit-
imated his paternity through a court order, apparently because        
he was unaware that such proceedings were available.164 When the 
child was three years old, the mother married a man who later peti-
tioned to adopt the child.165 Under state law, only the consent of      
the mother was necessary to move forward with the adoption,       
even though the adoption would foreclose any parental rights of the 
biological father.166 
 When presented with the issue, the Court gave considerable at-
tention to which man had created a family with the child, describing 
the stepfather as “part of the family unit in which the child was        
in fact living”167 and the proposed adoption as “giv[ing] full recogni-
tion to a family unit already in existence.”168 By contrast, Quilloin 
had not had actual custody of his child, nor had he sought custody.169 
Occasional visits and financial support were outweighed, in the 
Court’s mind, by the everyday fathering performed by the child’s 
stepfather; Quilloin had failed to gain parental rights and status.170 
Interestingly, although the child’s stepfather had to legally adopt    
the child, in one sense the Court recognized the stepfather’s caretak-
ing labor as transferring to himself what was at least initially Quil-
loin’s opportunity to formalize his status as father. Parental labor 
was thus significant in transferring parental status from Quilloin to 
the stepfather.  
 One year later, Caban v. Mohammed again raised a contested 
stepparent adoption in a context that made explicit the centrality of 
an unwed father’s labor.171 The biological parents, Abdiel Caban and 
Maria Mohammed, lived together for five years and represented 
themselves as a married couple (the two could not legally marry as 
Caban was separated, but not divorced, from another woman).172 
These years encompassed the first four years of their son’s life and 
the first two years of their daughter’s life.173 Caban was listed on the 
children’s birth certificates, and they lived as a unitary family.174 The 
family unit dissolved when Mohammed moved with her children to 
 163. Id. at 250-51. 
 164. Id. at 254. 
 165. Id. at 247. 
 166. Id. at 248-49. 
 167. Id. at 252-53. 
 168. Id. at 255. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. at 255-56.  
 171. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 172. Id. at 382. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. 
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live with another man, whom she married one month later.175 For the 
first few years of his children’s lives, however, Caban had contributed 
significant caretaking work.176 
 The dispute arose when Mohammed sent the children to Puerto 
Rico with her mother. Caban went to Puerto Rico to visit the children 
and, without warning or consent, took the children back to New 
York.177 Possibly in response, Mohammed’s husband (the children’s 
stepfather) then filed a petition to adopt the children.178 In turn,     
Caban—who, since he and Mohammed had broken up, had secured    
a divorce from his first wife and married his next girlfriend—filed     
a cross-petition with his new wife not only opposing Mohammed’s 
stepparent adoption, but also asking that Caban’s wife instead be 
allowed to adopt the children, terminating Mohammed’s status as 
legal mother.179 
 Despite the mirror-image claims brought by Caban and Moham-
med, New York law viewed the claims differently. In order to com-
plete the adoption process, any stepmother wishing to legally adopt 
her stepchildren was required to secure the consent of the biological 
mother.180 In contrast, although Caban as biological father had a 
right to be heard as part of the proceedings—a lesson learned from 
Stanley—his consent was not required.181 This placed unwed biologi-
cal fathers alongside parents whose legal status had been terminat-
ed, either because they relinquished the child or because they were 
declared unfit.182 
 The Court held that the gendered classification was unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause.183 Notably, its reasoning 
was grounded in Caban’s everyday caretaking work: 
The present case demonstrates that an unwed father may have a 
relationship with his children fully comparable to that of the 
mother. Appellant Caban, appellee Maria Mohammed, and their 
two children lived together as a natural family for several years. 
As members of this family, both mother and father participated in 
the care and support of their children. There is no reason to believe 
that the Caban children—aged 4 and 6 at the time of the adoption 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 382-83. 
 178. Id. at 383. 
 179. Id.  
 180.  Id. at 385-86. 
 181. Id. at 384. 
 182. Id. at 385-87. 
 183. Id. at 382.  
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proceedings—had a relationship with their mother unrivaled by 
the affection and concern of their father.184 
The Court went further to specify that where the father had not “par-
ticipate[d] in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection 
Clause precludes the State from withholding from him the privilege 
of vetoing the adoption of that child.”185 Caban’s status as father thus 
turned entirely on being an active participant in the everyday raising 
of his children—his parental labor. 
 Even the dissents from the Court’s opinion focused on the distinc-
tion between biology and labor. Justice Stewart, for example, explicit-
ly rejected the bodily unity theory that parental status is generated 
through genetic connection, stating that “[p]arental rights do not 
spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and 
child.”186 He went on to acknowledge the labor interest of the mother; 
a mother “carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental 
relationship is clear.”187 By contrast, the biological father’s parental 
status could be shown by an “actual relationship between father and 
child.”188 Justice Stevens also highlighted the mother’s greater work 
in caring for the child: “Only the mother carries the child; it is she 
who has the constitutional right to decide whether to bear it or 
not.”189 Even after birth, Justice Stevens believed “it is virtually inev-
itable that from conception through infancy the mother will constant-
ly be faced with decisions about how best to care for the child, where-
as it is much less certain that the father will be confronted with com-
parable problems.”190 He would hold that because “newborn infants 
and very young children in the custody of their natural mothers” 
were the typical subjects of adoption petitions by stepparents, this 
self-evidently demonstrated the greater parental claim of mothers 
than fathers.191 
 Justice Stevens gave further voice to these beliefs when he wrote 
the Court’s opinion in the final unwed father case, Lehr v. Robert-
son.192 His statement of the issue presented by the case betrayed its 
resolution: “whether New York has sufficiently protected an unmar-
 184. Id. at 389 (footnote omitted). 
 185. Id. at 392. 
 186. Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 406. 
 191. See id. at 410. 
 192. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
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ried father’s inchoate relationship with a child whom he has never 
supported and rarely seen in the two years since her birth.”193 
 What Justice Stevens did not acknowledge, but Justice White 
pointed out, was that the reason that the unmarried father’s rela-
tionship was inchoate was that the mother had prevented the rela-
tionship from developing further.194 As summarized in the introduc-
tion, White’s dissent noted approvingly that Jonathan Lehr lived 
with Lorraine Robertson throughout her pregnancy, and Lehr visited 
her every day in the hospital after she gave birth.195 When she was 
discharged with their daughter Jessica, however, she concealed her 
location from Lehr, who only tracked her down with the assistance of 
a private detective.196 By that time, she had married Richard Robert-
son, who petitioned to adopt Jessica when she was two years old.197  
 Justice Stevens, by contrast, did not explain the factual back-
ground giving rise to the case, and instead turned to Justice Stew-
art’s dissent from Caban, quoting and italicizing for emphasis the 
idea that “ ‘[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown from the biologi-
cal connection between parent and child. They require relationships 
more enduring.’ ”198 The test for constitutional protection of the pa-
rental relationship between unwed biological father and child, Jus-
tice Stevens concluded, required both a biological link and the father’s 
“ ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child.’ ”199 The 
biological connection was an opportunity to develop a parental rela-
tionship but did not create the parental relationship itself.200  
 Although the Court has not been faced with another case present-
ing the claims of unwed biological fathers in the context of family 
law, it has reinforced the reliance on relationships as parentage in 
the context of citizenship and immigration. Federal law specifies dif-
ferent paths to U.S. citizenship for a child born out of the country to 
one citizen parent and one noncitizen parent. If the child’s father is 
the American citizen, he must formally codify his paternity by legiti-
mating the child according to the laws of the child’s residence, sign-
ing a statement under oath acknowledging his paternity, or securing 
 193. Id. at 249-50. 
 194. Id. at 269, 271 (White, J., dissenting).  
 195. Id. at 268-69. 
 196. Id. at 269. 
 197. Id. at 250 (majority opinion). 
 198. Id. at 260 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting)). 
 199. Id. at 261 (alteration in original) (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392). 
 200. Id. Multiple commentators have criticized Lehr’s treatment of the constitutional 
rights of fathers. See, e.g., Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fa-
thers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1984); Jeffrey A. Parness & 
Zachary Townsend, Legal Paternity (and Other Parenthood) After Lehr and Michael H., 43 
U. TOL. L. REV. 225 (2012). 
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a court order declaring his paternity.201 If the American citizen par-
ent is the mother, she need not take such additional steps.202 In 2000, 
Tuan Anh Nguyen, the child of an American citizen father and Viet-
namese mother who had lived with his father in the United States 
since he was six years old, challenged the law when he faced deporta-
tion after being convicted of sexual assault on a child.203 
 In upholding the statute, the Court gave two justifications for the 
additional requirements placed upon fathers in order to bestow their 
citizenship on their child. One was to insure that a biological rela-
tionship between parent and child did exist: while it could be as-
sumed in the case of the mother, the Court held that a father could 
fairly be required to at least formally state his relationship.204 (Jus-
tice O’Connor, writing in dissent, pointed out that a separate provi-
sion not challenged by Nguyen required that fathers show “ ‘a blood 
relationship between the [alleged child] and the father . . . by clear 
and convincing evidence,’ ” making this justification redundant at 
best.205) A biological relationship, therefore, was a threshold require-
ment for transferal of citizenship. 
 The second reason added a parallel requirement of some kind of 
parental labor—or at least potential labor. In contrast to the stand-
ard of an extant substantial relationship applied to unwed biological 
fathers seeking legal parentage, the Court viewed the formal legiti-
mizing requirement as a means  
to ensure that the child and the citizen parent have some demon-
strated opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship 
that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the law, but one that 
consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connection be-
tween child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.206 
The focus on the opportunity for a relationship, rather than on prov-
ing the existence of an actual relationship, points to a few interesting 
implications. As Justice O’Connor pointed out, the interest in ensur-
ing that only those children who have become “American” in some 
way are able to gain citizenship is not served well by the require-
ments at issue.207 Nguyen, after all, had grown up in the United 
States in the care of his American citizen father.208 Despite the      
undisputed presence of the actual relationship described by the 
 201. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 59 (2001). 
 202. Id. at 59-60. 
 203. Id. at 57. 
 204. Id. at 62-64. 
 205. Id. at 80 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1) (1994)). 
 206. Id. at 64-65 (majority opinion).  
 207. Id. at 83-85 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 208. Id. at 85.  
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Court—as well as long-term domestic residency, which went above 
and beyond the law’s requirements209—his father’s failure to fill     
out paperwork before Nguyen’s eighteenth birthday doomed his     
citizenship request.210  
 A final example highlights the precarious position of unwed bio-
logical fathers. In the 1984 case Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Su-
preme Court was faced with facts that combined biological, marital, 
and functional theories of parenthood.211 Michael H. had an affair 
with his neighbor Carole D., who was married to Gerald D.212 Michael 
and Carole’s affair produced a daughter, Victoria, but “Gerald was 
listed as father on the birth certificate.”213 During the first three 
years of Victoria’s life, she spent periods of time living with Gerald, 
Michael, and a third man with whom Carole had a relationship.214 
Both Gerald and Michael treated Victoria as their own child and held 
her out as their child publicly.215 After Carole reconciled with Gerald, 
Michael sought a legal declaration of paternity and visitation rights 
with Victoria.216 Under California state law, however, Gerald was 
presumed to be Victoria’s legal father, subject only to rebuttal by ei-
ther the husband or mother.217 California law thus denied Michael 
the opportunity to present evidence regarding his relationship with 
Victoria. Michael challenged the state statute as violations of both 
procedural and substantive due process.218 Citing the Supreme 
Court’s line of unwed father cases, Michael argued that he could 
show both that he was Victoria’s biological father and that he had 
created a substantial parent-child relationship with her, and thus 
was entitled to protection of his relationship, or at the very least a 
hearing at which he could present evidence as to his paternity.219 
 The Court rejected his argument. In the eyes of the Court, the 
previous cases did not depend upon a biological and substantial rela-
tionship in isolation, but rather “the historic respect—indeed, sancti-
ty would not be too strong a term—traditionally accorded to the rela-
tionships that develop within the unitary family.”220 The question at 
issue was thus not whether California’s statute was refusing to give 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. at 61-62 (majority opinion). 
 211. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 212. Id. at 113.  
 213. Id. at 113-14. 
 214. Id. at 114.   
 215. Id. at 113-14. 
 216. Id. at 114. 
 217.   Id. at 117-18. 
 218. Id. at116. 
 219. Id. at 119. 
 220. Id. at 123. 
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adequate procedural or substantive protections to Michael’s parental 
relationship, but whether there was a relationship at all—in the 
words of Justice Scalia writing for the Court, “whether the relation-
ship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria has 
been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of 
our society.”221 As might be predicted from the question, the Court 
answered in the negative.222 
 Interestingly, both concurrences and dissents authored by other 
Justices turned on the question of Michael’s relationship with Victo-
ria. Although Justice Stevens concurred in the Court’s judgment, he 
wrote separately to emphasize that the Court’s past cases, citing 
Stanley and Caban, “demonstrate[d] that enduring ‘family’ relation-
ships may develop in unconventional settings.”223 He concluded, how-
ever, that Michael had an adequate opportunity under the California 
law to establish his relationship.224 By contrast, both Justice Brennan 
and Justice White dissented on the basis that any unwed biological 
father who had created a substantial parent-child relationship had a 
constitutional liberty interest in his parental status.225  
D.   Implications 
  Unwed fathers thus must meet two separate requirements in or-
der to have a constitutional parental right. First, they must have a 
genetic link to the child in question. Second, they must create a rela-
tionship with the child, investing labor into their parental status. 
There are obvious tangible consequences to this regime. Unwed fa-
thers are put at a disadvantage as compared to unwed mothers and 
married parents for the span of time when the unwed father has not 
yet been able to build a relationship with his child. This could either 
be because the child is too young, the child has not yet been born, or 
the father has been unable to contact his child due to actions of the 
mother. The Supreme Court has not yet spoken to the problems that 
Laura Oren labels “advanced Lehr line-drawing,”226 except to the ex-
tent that the majority opinion in Lehr was implicitly unconcerned 
with Lehr’s inability to find his child in order to create a substantial 
relationship.  
 In the years since Lehr, however, new practices meant to protect 
children have unintentionally exacerbated potential problems for 
 221. Id. at 124. 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 224. Id.  
 225. See id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 157-58 (White, J., dissenting). 
 226. Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop-Up Pops?: How to Determine When Putative 
Fathers Can Block the Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 153, 159 (2006). 
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new unwed fathers. For example, at the turn of the twenty-first cen-
tury the public’s attention was captured by a series of stories about 
abandoned and/or murdered newborns, most colorfully embodied by a 
teenager attending her high school prom who gave birth in a bath-
room, put the baby in the trash, and returned to the dance.227 Aiming 
to give such mothers an option to relinquish the child rather than kill 
and discard it, almost every state passed some form of a safe haven 
law, under which a child’s parent may anonymously leave the infant 
at specific locations without exposing oneself to potential abandon-
ment or other criminal charges.228 An obvious consequence of the an-
onymity generally provided to the abandoning parent, nearly always 
the child’s mother, is that it is difficult if not impossible to ensure 
that the child’s father consented or was aware of the relinquish-
ment.229 Multiple scholars have criticized safe haven laws as creating 
“thwarted fathers by legal design who do not enjoy even a modicum 
of procedural due process.”230  
 In addition to the concrete problems created by the current consti-
tutional understanding of father’s rights, broader conceptual issues 
arise when viewing the issue through the lens of how parental rights 
are acquired. One way of reading Supreme Court doctrine is to con-
clude that the prebirth labor of unwed fathers is not recognized or 
credited in establishing their parental rights. Further examination of 
the postbirth labor, however, demonstrates that unwed fathers do not 
have any Lockean labor path into parenthood. Requiring a substan-
tial relationship with the child is a functional requirement: it is justi-
fied by the child-centric concern of protecting those relationships that 
are important to the child. Although functional doctrines of legal par-
entage overlap with a labor-based theory, a true labor-based theory 
would view a man as earning his status of father through labor for 
the benefit of the child.  
 227. See Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 753, 754 (2006). For an in-depth discussion of the psychological characteris-
tics of young mothers who commit neonaticide, or killing one’s child within twenty-four 
hours of birth, see Shannon Farley, Comment, Neonaticide: When the Bough Breaks and 
the Cradle Falls, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 597 (2004). 
 228. See Jeffrey A. Parness & Therese A. Clarke Arado, Safe Haven, Adoption and 
Birth Record Laws: Where Are the Daddies?, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 207, 212-13 (2007). 
 229. See id. at 211-13; see also Jeffrey A. Parness, Adoption Notices to Genetic Fathers: 
No to Scarlet Letters, Yes to Good-Faith Cooperation, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 63, 71 (2005). 
 230. Oren, supra note 226, at 189; see also Jeffrey A. Parness, Deserting Mothers, 
Abandoned Babies, Lost Fathers: Dangers in Safe Havens, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 335 
(2006); Jeffrey A. Parness, Lost Paternity in the Culture of Motherhood: A Different View of 
Safe Haven Laws, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 81 (2007); Parness & Arado, supra note 228; Jeffrey A. 
Parness, Systematically Screwing Dads: Out of Control Paternity Schemes, 54 WAYNE L. 
REV. 641 (2008); Lucinda J. Cornett, Note, Remembering the Endangered “Child”: Limiting 
the Definition of “Safe Haven” and Looking Beyond the Safe Haven Law Framework, 98 KY. 
L.J. 833 (2010). 
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 A biological father’s rights are thus fundamentally relational, 
turning either on his relationship with the biological mother or with 
the child. The only way for a man to ensure parental rights before 
birth is to marry the biological mother, a marriage-based classifica-
tion that the Supreme Court has explicitly held raises no equal pro-
tection concerns.231 And the only way for an unwed man to ensure 
parental rights after birth is to create a functional relationship with 
the child, which is dependent on the biological mother’s willingness 
to allow such a bond to develop.232 
 This reinforces a view of men as, at best, occasional parents. Nan-
cy Dowd summarized the Supreme Court’s language as reflecting 
“social disdain for unmarried fathers”233 and the doctrine as “ground-
ed in gender assumptions that women naturally parent, while men, 
outside of marriage, choose to parent or not, and nearly always 
choose not to do so.”234 Mothers are viewed as the primary parent, 
both in terms of work and a more intangible conception of parenting 
as self-sacrifice; the mother is “the parent who performs the bulk of 
childcare, the parent who cares enough to give up herself.”235  
 This narrative not only depends upon women being more suited to 
be parents, however—it also relies upon a deep-seated assumption 
that men do not want, perhaps should not want, to take on the nur-
turing and emotional work of parentage. Susan Frelich Appleton ana-
lyzed the Supreme Court’s recent language on abortion as expressing 
“disapproval of deviation” from the dominant understanding that 
“men seek to avoid parenthood and all attendant responsibilities, 
both emotional and material, while women harbor such a powerful 
desire to mother that they are willing to take these men to court if 
necessary to achieve that goal.”236 Nurture is seen as fundamentally 
“unmanly.”237 In a self-fulfilling cycle, these beliefs are used to justify 
policies that make it even harder for men to be active parents. In 
1992, for example, Mary Becker described “a conspiracy of silence 
forbid[ding] discussion of what is common knowledge: mothers are 
usually emotionally closer to their children than fathers,” before us-
ing that common knowledge to argue for a strong deference to moth-
 231. E.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978). 
 232. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 269-71 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
 233. Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing 
Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1297 (2005). 
 234. Id. at 1310. 
 235. Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 57, 67 (2012). 
 236. Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 255, 
325 (2011). 
 237. Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & 
SOC’Y 201, 239 (2008). 
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er’s choices in custody disputes.238 Although Becker’s proposal was 
not adopted formally, there is strong evidence that custody decisions 
are strongly biased toward granting custody to mothers rather than 
fathers.239 Mothers are often offered more parental leave than fa-
thers,240 and men who are offered and take parental leave are viewed 
unfavorably by their employers.241 Even the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged such inequalities in Nevada Department of Human Resources 
v. Hibbs, remarking that “[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles 
are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic 
responsibilities for men. Because employers continued to regard the 
family as the woman’s domain, they often denied men similar ac-
commodations or discouraged them from taking leave.”242 
 The doctrinal non-recognition of father’s parental labor, therefore, 
has broad implications for the constitutional status of fathers, bal-
ance in parenting, and gender stereotypes outside of the home. In the 
next Part, I propose that greater recognition of parental labor, even 
prebirth labor, be incorporated into parentage laws. 
IV.   LABOR-BASED THEORIES INTO DOCTRINE 
 Prebirth parental labor performed by unwed biological fathers 
should be understood as fulfilling the extant “substantial relation-
ship” requirement. Current doctrine, as summarized above, requires 
both a biological relationship plus a significant personal relationship 
between the unwed father and the child before the father’s status     
as parent is constitutionally recognized. I argue that prebirth labor 
fulfills the same goals as the substantial relationship test, by    
providing tangible proof that the father intends to be an active and 
engaged parent.  
 Prebirth labor is also a more concrete method of understanding 
and recognizing intent in a context where explicit intent is rare. Pre-
birth labor is not a functional theory of parentage; functional theories 
turn on the psychological significance of existing relationships and 
are justified through explicit concern for the child’s well-being. In-
tent, by contrast, has a more attenuated connection to the child’s 
well-being. My proposed prebirth labor test thus operationalizes in-
tent as a parentage rule.  
 238. Becker, supra note 32, at 137.  
 239. See Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced 
Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 967-75 (2005). 
 240. See David K. Haase, Evaluating the Desirability of Federally Mandated Parental 
Leave, 22 FAM. L.Q. 341, 360 (1988). 
 241. See Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Male-
ness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1073-74 (1996).  
 242. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003). 
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 Many of the proposals implementing intent to be a parent provide 
standard rules and procedures that require clear expression of that 
intent—for example, in writing in the context of ART, where written 
agreements are already in use.243 In contrast, I propose prebirth labor 
as a subcategory of intent: a way to make intent clearer in a setting 
in which written arrangements are rare, and where the law is al-
ready concerned with the intent of an unwed father to seize the op-
portunity of parenthood to build a significant relationship. 
A.   Mechanics 
 I define prebirth parental labor as actions undertaken that pre-
pare for the birth of the child and plan for future caretaking work. 
Although by no means an exhaustive list, examples of prebirth pa-
rental labor performed by a biological father include the following: 
 Requesting paternity leave. 
 Requesting future accommodations in work schedule or duties 
to accommodate childcare, such as requesting specific shift 
schedules or reducing overtime hours. 
 Actions that are aimed at reducing safety risks to the child, 
such as quitting smoking or baby-proofing a residence.  
 Planning childcare arrangements, such as contacting a day-
care near his home or childcare affiliated with his employ-
ment.  
 Prospectively signing a child up for his insurance. 
 Educating himself about childcare, such as enrolling in a par-
enting class (with or without the biological mother). 
 Taking steps to list the child on benefits such as insurance 
plans. 
 Buying parenting supplies such as diapers, baby wipes, or a 
crib. 
 Setting up a nursery in his residence. 
 Establishing a savings account or trust for the child. 
 Going to prenatal or childbirth classes and appointments with 
the biological mother. 
 Drawing up a preliminary parenting and custody schedule 
with the biological mother. 
Some of the examples given above require that the father have signif-
icant funds available to him or depend upon an amicable relationship 
between the biological father and mother. Although such actions 
should be recognized as prebirth parental labor, money or an amica-
ble relationship should not be required. Thus, a father with limited 
 243. Purvis, supra note 27, at 212. 
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funds who does not have a cooperative relationship with the biologi-
cal mother should nonetheless have options such as a free local par-
enting class and setting up a thrift-store crib in one corner of his bed-
room open to him.  
 The labor of a biological father, in other words, need not be done 
with the mother’s permission. To the extent that the current re-
quirement of a substantial relationship cannot in practice be met 
without the cooperation of the mother, by allowing contact between 
the child and biological father, this removes an obstacle to unwed bio-
logical fatherhood. This shift will address the Lehr example of 
thwarted fathers,244 by allowing a father to take independent actions 
to secure his parental status even if the biological mother intends or 
attempts to hinder his plans. 
 Furthermore, such actions must be taken with the intent to be a 
parent. For example, a man who moves in with a new girlfriend, who 
herself has a young child, cannot cite a nursery in the new girl-
friend’s apartment as evidence of his own prebirth parental labor. As 
will be discussed further below, if recognition of parental labor is ex-
tended beyond the context of unwed prebirth biological fathers, this 
aspect of the intent requirement prevents accidental acquisition of 
parental status by nannies or other persons who perform caretaking 
work without any intention of being recognized as legal parents. 
 Finally, I propose assessing the presence of a “substantial” 
amount of prebirth parental labor. This is necessary in order to en-
sure that a trivial gesture—the purchase of a single box of diapers, 
for example—does not give the prebirth father an easier path to 
parenthood than the postbirth father, and to treat acquisition of pa-
rental status with the gravity it deserves. A “substantial” amount of 
labor cannot be easily quantified, but the guiding principle should be 
labor sufficient to show that the father is apparently preparing          
to serve as primary caretaker for the child for significant periods       
of time. 
 The procedure for asserting status as legal parent would be the 
same as for past claimants such as Peter Stanley, Mohammed Caban, 
or Jonathan Lehr: determination of legal parentage would be a 
threshold determination at the beginning of a custody or visitation 
claim. Legal parentage can be understood as standing for custody, 
visitation, or blocking an adoption that would terminate parental sta-
tus. Status as legal parent gives a person the ability to seek custody 
and visitation, but the actual custody determination is determined by 
assessing what would be in the child’s best interest.245 Recognition as 
 244. See supra Part III.D.  
 245. A minor complication to this rule is statutes that recognize functional parents as 
something more than a legal stranger, but something less than a legal parent.  
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a legal parent, therefore, would not guarantee custody or any visita-
tion rights with the child. 
B.   Broader Implications 
 As explained above, I propose that prebirth parental labor be un-
derstood as fulfilling the “substantial relationship” required in addi-
tion to a biological link in order for an unwed biological father to 
have status as parent. This would treat the substantial relationship 
requirement as akin to the explanation given in Nguyen that the real 
concern is for a father who will take advantage of the opportunity to 
build a relationship with his child.246 
 1.   Married Biological Fathers 
 The natural next question is whether parental labor should be 
recognized for existing children as well—that is, whether postbirth 
parental labor without the child present should be recognized as a 
labor-based theory of parentage that similarly triggers parental sta-
tus. On the one hand, this would provide a more equitable answer for 
fathers such as Jonathan Lehr, who was eager for a relationship with 
his child but could not create one due to the biological mother’s ac-
tions.247 On the other hand, there are obvious problems with the bio-
logical father of a ten-year-old child suddenly developing an interest 
in exercising parental rights. The potential parental rights of the 
adults must be balanced with the child’s interest in stability. Alt-
hough two parents are arguably better than one, one parent with set-
tled legal rights may be better than one parent and one potential but 
unrecognized parent.  
 A natural limiting principle can be found in existing parental 
statutes. For example, a similar dilemma is created in the context of 
the marital presumption. On the one hand, as demonstrated in Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D., an extremely strong marital presumption can 
have the perverse effect of shutting out an unmarried biological and 
functional father.248 On the other hand, if the presumed marital fa-
ther is willing to raise the child as his own, it could harm the child to 
allow the biological father to claim legal fatherhood at any point be-
fore the child turned eighteen. One solution to this, as implemented 
by the Uniform Parentage Act, is to impose a statute of limitations of 
two years after the child’s birth.249 If the biological father does not 
 246. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64-65 (2001). 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 192-200.  
 248. See supra text accompanying notes 211-25. 
 249. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607(a) (2000) (amended 2002). 
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bring proceedings during that time, the presumed marital father’s 
status cannot be challenged.250  
 I would adopt this standard, with the modification that if an un-
wed biological father asserts parental status using parental labor and 
has not had significant contact with the child, he must show that the 
reason for the lack of a relationship was reasonably beyond his con-
trol. Although I propose that unwed biological fathers be recognized 
as legal fathers without requiring the consent of the biological moth-
er, that does not justify failing to attempt to engage in cooperative 
parenting, at least to the extent that the father takes on caretaking 
labor and begins to build a relationship with the child. If the unwed 
biological father asks the mother for time with the child and is de-
nied, that should not be held against him in the determination of his 
legal status.251 Neither should circumstances that prevent his contact 
with the child, such as a father who is an active member of the mili-
tary. Biological fathers who refuse to make good faith efforts, howev-
er—a father who voluntarily accepts a job across the country when he 
could reasonably be expected to find employment closer to the child, 
or who refuses to compromise with the mother in setting times for 
him to care for the child—cannot point to labor without the child pre-
sent to satisfy the parental labor requirement postbirth. 
 2.   Wider Applications: Intent-Based Parentage 
 One solution to recognizing the parental status of nonbiological 
and nonpregnant persons is to recognize the intent to be a parent as 
itself a rule of parentage. First arising in the context of assisted re-
productive technologies, intent has been proposed as a freestanding 
rule of parentage. In other words, intent alone could create status as 
legal parent, regardless of genetic connection to the child or future 
child. John Lawrence Hill, one of the earliest proponents of intent as 
a rule, offered three primary justifications: the “but-for argument” 
that intent recognizes the persons without whom the child would not 
have been created,252 the contractual argument that the original 
agreements of all participants in an ART pregnancy should be en-
 250. Id. The statute of limitations is not applied if the presumed father and biological 
mother were neither cohabitating nor sexually active during the probable time of the 
child’s conception or if the presumed father has never publicly acknowledged and treated 
the child as his own. Id. § 607(b). 
 251. Because custody and visitation decisions would still be made using the best inter-
est of the child standard, however, such fathers would likely be at a disadvantage if a cus-
tody suit sought to substantially interfere with the child’s settled family life. 
 252. Hill, supra note 26, at 414-15 (“What is essential to parenthood is not the biologi-
cal tie between parent and child but the preconception intention to have a child, accompa-
nied by undertaking whatever action is necessary to bring a child into the world.” (empha-
sis in original)). 
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forced,253 and the avoiding-uncertainty argument that intent provides 
the clearest prebirth answer to parentage.254 
 In recent years, intent has been more fully explored as a parent-
age rule that provides a practical and more equitable solution in 
many contexts. In a previous article, I explored the normative ad-
vantages to intent, arguing that it facilitates and encourages respon-
sible parenting.255 Such analysis considers intent as a freestanding 
rule to be added and incorporated into existing rules.256 Considera-
tion of intent through the theoretical lens of property acquisition fur-
ther illuminates the potential of intent, as well as broadens how in-
tent might be implemented. 
 It is clear that intent has no connection to the bodily unity theory 
of parentage; intent is entirely divorced from considering biological 
connection between potential parent and child. Indeed, intent is often 
proposed as a rule that justifies disregarding the genetic connection 
between egg and sperm donors and resulting children.257 Therefore, 
intent can be understood as part of the move away from the bodily 
unity theory of parentage. 
 Because intent is often understood and justified in contractual 
terms, the Lockean labor theory may not initially seem to be a sub-
stantially better fit. One criticism of intent, particularly when it is 
implemented through private agreements that resemble contracts, is 
that it is effectively contracting to sell, or at least transfer, a child. 
The plan to raise a child, however, is planning to perform parental 
labor. As I previously explained, in the context of describing the po-
tential emotional trauma to intended parents who are not given the 
child they have been anticipating, 
[t]he intended parents plan for a child at least as long as parents 
who reproduce through traditional means—even longer, to the ex-
tent that finding gamete donors and a surrogate and then waiting 
through the preparation and medical procedures is a longer period 
of “trying to conceive” than traditional sexual reproduction. 
Throughout this time, intended parents invest financially in pre-
paring for their child’s arrival, plan to take maternity or paternity 
leave, and generally ready for their child’s birth as any other     
parents would. Intended parents often support the surrogate not 
 253. Id. at 415-16 (“[T]he gestational host and the genetic progenitors should be held to 
their original promises not to seek any form of parental rights in the child.”). 
 254. Id. at 417 (“Where the identity of the parents is not determined at the time of 
conception, all parties are affected adversely.”). 
 255. See Purvis, supra note 27. 
 256. Id. at 230-41.  
 257. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: 
Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. 
C.R. & C.L. 201, 212-15 (2009); Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted 
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002). 
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only financially through covering the costs of her pregnancy, but 
also participate in the pregnancy by attending doctor’s visits with 
the surrogate.258 
Intent, therefore, can be demonstrated through behavior.259 Moreo-
ver, the behavior is prebirth labor. Intent as a parentage rule thus is 
supported, at least in some forms, through a Lockean labor-based 
theory of parentage.  
 The labor-based theory of parentage thus has application outside 
of the context of biological fathers when applied as one form of intent-
based theories. For example, parental labor and prebirth labor in 
particular illuminate the marital presumption. In one sense, the 
Lockean labor theory of parentage could be deployed to strengthen 
the marital presumption, by converting it from an outdated assump-
tion regarding unknowable genetics to the recognition of marriage as 
acceptance and intent to parent the children born during the mar-
riage. The labor theory, in other words, could treat marriage as a 
proxy for intent. 
 More interesting, however, is use of a labor theory of parentage as 
another reason to eliminate the marital presumption altogether. If 
parental labor underlies claims of parentage based both in genetics 
and in intent, the marital presumption may be redundant: one labor-
based rule could apply to both married and unmarried fathers. Ex-
pansion of labor-based parentage as an intent-based theory divorced 
entirely from biological relationship would also create greater unifi-
cation of parentage theory and rules between opposite-sex and same-
sex couples. As Nancy Polikoff points out, recent victories for the par-
enting claims of same-sex spouses have made “the parental status of 
a nonbiological mother dependent entirely upon her marriage to the 
biological mother.”260 Polikoff argues that although employing the 
marital presumption in states that permit same-sex marriage may 
lead to victory in individual cases, it will create a growing gap be-
tween children whose parents marry, and thus whose family unit re-
ceives legal protection, and children whose parents either cannot or 
 258. Id. at 238. 
 259. Notably, some scholars would treat intent and behavior as two separate catego-
ries. For example, Alicia Brokars Kelly recently proposed economic sharing behaviors as a 
test to identify intimate partners as an economic unit specifically in contrast to intent or 
consent-based tests. See Alicia Brokars Kelly, Navigating Gender in Modern Intimate 
Partnership Law, 14 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 45 (2012) (“It is true that commitment often does 
shape economic behavior: as I have said, more committed partners are more likely to share 
economic resources. However, levels of commitment are difficult to ascertain, vary across 
couples and in any event can change and even be abandoned. Moreover, it is behavior that 
directly shapes the financial situation of the family and of each partner. The standard I 
propose is based on behavior and not intent.”). 
 260. Nancy D. Polikoff, The New “Illegitimacy”: Winning Backward in the Protection of 
the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721, 723 (2012). 
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choose not to marry.261 A labor-based understanding of intent can be 
consistently employed both before and after birth, can be used re-
gardless of the sexual orientation of the parents, and provides the 
same results whether the parents are married or not. 
 Finally, a labor-based understanding of intent also offers promise 
for the more theoretical question of recognizing more than two par-
ents. Although California Governor Jerry Brown recently vetoed a 
bill that would permit recognition of more than two legal parents,262 
all fifty states currently cap formal recognition of legal parents at 
two.263 This limit has been criticized by a rich vein of legal scholar-
ship, arguing that more than two parents would have myriad bene-
fits for a child and would recognize complex family relationships that 
are currently unacknowledged by the law.264  
 A labor-based understanding of intent would support the possibil-
ity of more than two legal parents. The questions are distinct, but 
related: first, How should parentage be determined? Second, how 
many parents should there be? The answer to the first can determine 
the answer to the second: if your answer is that the genetic parents of 
a child should be identified as legal parents (at least if they are mar-
ried),265 then your answer to the second will be two. If your answer to 
the first includes intent-based theories, by contrast, the answer to 
the second is wide open. 
 Incorporating a labor-based theory of intent provides new solu-
tions to some of the criticisms of intent in the context of the number 
of legal parents. When intent is understood as analogous to a con-
tract, the theory itself does not provide a limiting principle to the 
number of legal parents. Twenty people might sign an agreement 
 261. Id. at 722.  
 262. Jim Sanders, Jerry Brown Vetoes Bill Allowing More Than Two Parents, SACRA-
MENTO BEE (Sept. 30, 2012, 1:22 PM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/ 
2012/09/jerry-brown-vetoes-bill-allowing-more-than-two-parents.html. 
 263. In states that recognize functional parents as having some legal rights and obliga-
tions, more than two people may have a legally cognizable relationship with the child. For 
example, Pennsylvania courts recently grappled with competing claims regarding the cus-
tody and child support obligations between three people: two women who had been in a 
nine-year relationship that produced four children and a male friend who acted as sperm 
donor to biologically father two of the children and had at least some role in raising them. 
Although the court recognized all three as indispensable parties to the proceedings, the 
three were described as two parents and one person with in loco parentis status. See Jacob 
v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super Ct. 2007). 
 264. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 
(2008); Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 649 (2008); Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 
231 (2007); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights 
and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309 (2007); Laura 
T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2007). 
 265. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Disintegration of Families and Children’s Right to Their 
Parents, 10 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 4 (2011). 
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that they intend to collectively parent one child. This is in stark con-
trast to the California Supreme Court’s reasoning, when faced with 
the prospect of recognizing one legal father and two legal mothers, 
that to acknowledge a second legal mother would necessarily dimin-
ish the rights of the first: parental rights as a limited resource.266 La-
bor, by contrast, admits at least the possibility of a maximum num-
ber of parents, in that although it may occasionally seem otherwise, 
the tasks of parenthood are not unlimited. Caretaking labor shared 
among twenty people would create twenty babysitters: parental labor 
must be a significant amount of labor, not an occasional shift. 
C.   Potential Objections 
 Apart from what I argue are compelling theoretical and practical 
reasons that support a labor-based understanding of intent, it is sim-
ple to identify a few constituencies or supportive perspectives for 
such a proposal, particularly as I propose it be employed in the con-
text of unwed biological fathers. The fathers’ rights movement is per-
haps the most obvious,267 as well as movements advocating for non-
traditional parents such as parents utilizing ART or same-sex par-
ents. Supporters of child-centric approaches to parentage regimes 
might find common ground with the labor-based theory’s goal of cre-
ating stable rules of parentage that make it easier for an engaged 
second parent to protect his legal rights.268 
 1.   Feminist Objections 
 A particularly complex question is whether my proposal would or 
should be supported by feminists. Legal feminism could be defined 
most broadly as a vision of “true and substantive equality,”269 but dif-
ferent threads of feminist thought might view recognition of prebirth 
parental labor of unwed biological fathers as normatively quite dif-
ferent. It is my contention, however, that because my proposal at-
 266. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 n.8 (Cal. 1993). 
 267. See generally Richard S. Collier, The Fathers’ Rights Movement, Law Reform, and 
the New Politics of Fatherhood: Some Reflections on the UK Experience, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 65 (2009) (describing the British fathers’ rights movement challenging child 
support and custody resolutions). 
 268. But cf. Bartlett, supra note 87 (urging states to reject exclusivity of parental sta-
tus); Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 
UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991) (proposing a new “equality ideology” of parenting that would 
ideally result in an equal division of parenting responsibilities); Barbara Bennett Wood-
house, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1747 (1993) (arguing that recognition of parental rights by definition undermines a 
better definition of parenting as meeting children’s needs). 
 269. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (1986) (contrasting 
to critical legal studies, where the aim of critique is critique, and saying attempts to con-
struct affirmative programs are empty and unattractive). 
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tacks stereotypes regarding men as less willing or less suited to be 
fathers, it is a feminist suggestion. 
 A brief (if superficial) outline of the various types of feminism is 
helpful for assessing the context into which my argument fits. Liberal 
feminism might be described as more concerned with classification 
than subordination: one characterization summarized liberal femi-
nists in the 1980s as “argu[ing] that it is better to stress the similari-
ties of men and women and to minimize the differences,” so that men 
and women are governed by the same laws and rules.270 “By contrast, 
radical feminists argued against the assimilation that ‘sameness’ ar-
guments tended to produce and called for equality theories that rec-
ognized gender differences.”271 Radical feminism might be further 
subdivided into more modern schools such as dominance feminism, 
voiced most strongly in the groundbreaking work of Catharine 
MacKinnon.272 MacKinnon viewed society and the law as fundamen-
tally hierarchical; “the social relation between the sexes is organized 
so that men may dominate and women must submit and this relation 
is sexual—in fact, is sex.”273 In this view, law is “an instrument of 
subordination.”274 
 Another main division, and the most relevant for situating my 
proposal, is between different voice feminism and social construction-
ist feminism. Different voice feminism posits that there are certain 
traits that are identified with women that should be recognized and 
taken seriously as specifically female characteristics.275 One such fe-
male characteristic that different voice feminists argue should be 
employed is an ethic of care.276 Robin West provides an explanation 
that makes clear the connection between the ethic of care and the 
biological realities of pregnancy: 
Women are more empathic to the lives of others because women 
are physically tied to the lives of others in a way which men are 
not. Women’s moral voice is one of responsibility, duty and care for 
others because women’s material circumstance is one of responsi-
bility, duty and care for those who are first physically attached, then 
physically dependent, and then emotionally interdependent.277 
 270. Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REV. 19, 23 (1991). 
 271. Id. 
 272. See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).  
 273. Id. at 3. 
 274. Owen M. Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 251 (1989). 
 275. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the 
Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109, 120-22 (1991); see also Margaret Jane Radin, 
Reply: Please Be Careful with Cultural Feminism, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1567, 1568 (1993) (us-
ing the synonymous term “cultural feminism”). 
 276. Schroeder, supra note 275, at 121-22.  
 277. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 21 (1988). 
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The different voice feminist today views the ethic of care as tied to 
pregnancy in a way that makes surrogacy problematic.278 By con-
trast, the social constructionist criticizes some aspects of different 
voice feminism as essentialist by depending on “false universals.”279 
 My proposal is grounded in the social constructionist’s account of 
gender stereotypes. Twenty years ago, Ann Scales described the 
“enormous energies” spent by feminist legal scholars in “patching the 
cracks in the differences approach,” and questioned whether there 
are any differences “sufficiently ‘real’ and permanent to demand so-
cial accommodation.”280 My answer, for purposes of this proposal, is 
that there are not sufficiently permanent differences in parenting to 
justify different treatment by gender. I reject the contention that re-
lationships with others, particularly children, are fundamentally dif-
ferent because of the biological processes of pregnancy, and argue 
that gender stereotyping is harmful even where it suggests a particu-
lar strength of women in parenting.281 
 The methodology for this analysis is thus a continuation of exist-
ing feminist legal methods. As chronicled by Katharine Bartlett, fem-
inist legal methods include:  
(1) identifying and challenging those elements of existing legal 
doctrine that leave out or disadvantage women and members of 
other excluded groups (asking the “woman question”); (2) reason-
ing from an ideal in which legal resolutions are pragmatic re-
sponses to concrete dilemmas rather than static choices between 
opposing, often mismatched perspectives (feminist practical rea-
soning); and (3) seeking insights and enhanced perspectives 
through collaborative or interactive engagements with others 
based upon personal experience and narrative (consciousness-
raising).282 
The “woman question” is further explained as “examining how the 
law fails to take into account the experiences and values that seem 
 278. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Not of Woman Born: A Scientific Fantasy, 62 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 399, 441-45 (2011). 
 279. Cain, supra note 270, at 28. A related criticism not immediately germane for 
background purposes, but worth highlighting, is intersectionalism, which points out that 
gender essentialism that speaks of a universal woman’s experience is inaccurate in that it 
depends upon the assumption “that a unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolat-
ed and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of 
experience.” Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 581, 585 (1990). 
 280. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 
1373, 1374-75 (1986). 
 281. See Levit, supra note 241, at 1039 (describing issues of relational justice as “avoid-
ing gender role stereotyping in both directions”); see also id. at 1054-55. 
 282. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831 (1990). 
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more typical of women than of men, for whatever reason, or how ex-
isting legal standards and concepts might disadvantage women.”283  
 Instead, I propose “asking the gender question,” encompassing not 
only whether the law explicitly disadvantages women by failing to 
take their experiences into account, but also whether the law implic-
itly harms women by resting upon stereotypes.284 Asking the gender 
question can thus help to explain why even policies that seemingly 
honor women’s contributions can be harmful. For example, Naomi 
Mezey and Cornelia T.L. Pillard recently chronicled the “new mater-
nalism,” which at first blush appears to be a celebration of the power 
of mothers in the political process by  
revalidat[ing] motherhood as a source of pride and moral authority 
for women. . . . At bottom, however, new maternalist cultural as-
sumptions reinforce the unequal consequences that flow from gen-
dered family roles as they embrace and promote motherhood—and 
not parenthood or caregiving—as a value, an identity, an occupa-
tion, and a basis for political mobilization.285  
Mezey and Pillard thus criticize the new maternalism as supporting 
“a mythic understanding of mothering that perpetuates deep and un-
necessary inequalities between men and women and reinforces tradi-
tional understandings of the family.”286 
 Asking the gender question of the current restrictions on the pa-
rental rights of unwed, biological fathers highlights a narrative of 
family law already chronicled in masculinity studies. Masculinity 
studies analyze masculinity as a social construction and alternative 
gender stereotype,287 particularly how one conception of masculinity 
becomes dominant (and thereby oppressive).288 Nancy Dowd, one of 
 283. Id. at 837. 
 284. Adam Romero has previously proposed the use of “asking the gender question” 
and explicitly hypothesized that it might result in “advocating that women give up power 
to men in some realms, such as caretaking.” Adam P. Romero, Book Review, Methodologi-
cal Descriptions: “Feminist” and “Queer” Legal Theories, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 227, 240 
(2007) (reviewing JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM 
FEMINISM (2006)). Asking the gender question is thus similar to Darren Rosenblum’s pro-
posed “unsexing” of mothering as “a means to attack the linkage between biological sex 
(‘biosex’) and sex roles.” Rosenblum, supra note 235, at 60. But see Martha Albertson 
Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 653 (1992) (arguing that removing 
gender from the concept of “Mother” in the law is disingenuous and marginalizes biological 
differences and the women’s perspective). 
 285. Naomi Mezey & Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Against the New Maternalism, 18 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 229, 233-34 (2012). 
 286. Id. at 234. 
 287. See Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581, 585-86 (2010). 
 288. See Nancy E. Dowd, Asking the Man Question: Masculinities Analysis and Femi-
nist Theory, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 415, 418-19 (2010); see also John M. Kang, The Bur-
dens of Manliness, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 477, 487-91 (2010) (arguing that men are re-
quired to prove their masculinity through physical courage). 
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the leading scholars writing in masculinity studies today, argues that 
understandings of masculinity that discourage fathers from nurtur-
ing children “pervade the law in a variety of ways that are harmful   
to men in their relationship to each other, to women, and to             
the state.”289  
 Masculinity studies can therefore highlight how stereotypes about 
fathering and manhood harm gender equality and generate proposals 
that will lead to greater parity in parental caretaking roles. Nancy 
Dowd, for example, proposed a revised UPA that recognizes a social 
father at birth.290 Her social father is defined and identified through 
“the practice of nurture, either alone or in combination with other 
caretakers, as the sole or primary parent, or contributing as closely 
as possible to an equal amount of care giving in partnership with the 
other primary parent or parents. It is nonexclusive, cooperative par-
enting.”291 Dowd’s proposal thus differs substantially from mine; it is 
based in functional theories292 and explicitly requires “an affirmative 
commitment to cooperative parenting with the mother,”293 which I 
reject. What we share is a commitment to equalizing expectations 
and opportunities for both mothers and fathers to engage in mean-
ingful caretaking of their children. 
 My proposal will be appealing to feminists who come from a social 
constructionist perspective and who view gender stereotypes as 
themselves harmful.294 I argue that my proposal is feminist, in that it 
“adopts the view reflected by precedent that women and men both 
have the capacity to love a child deeply and that active engagement 
in caring for a child brings out this capacity.”295 
 2.   Criticisms of Prebirth Labor 
 There are at least two categories of concerns that might be raised 
in the wake of my arguments: first, objections to specific elements or 
consequences of prebirth parental labor as applied in the context of 
 289. Dowd, supra note 233, at 1322. 
 290. See Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 909, 931-38 (2006). 
 291. Dowd, supra note 233, at 1312. 
 292. See Dowd, supra note 290, at 917-18 & n.55. 
 293. Id. at 913. 
 294. See, e.g., Marjorie M. Schultz, Book Review, Questioning Commodification, 85 
CALIF. L. REV. 1841, 1855 (1997) (reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODI-
TIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS 
(1996)) (“In assessing social damage associated with reproductive policy, the problem of 
men detaching from children is as serious as is treating women as baby machines. Fur-
thermore, the damaging assumption that men can get paid for everything while women 
should act altruistically and be paid for almost nothing connected to their gender roles is 
very much alive and well.”). 
 295. Hendricks, supra note 94, at 432. 
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unwed biological fathers; and second, broader considerations relating 
to labor-based theories of intent. 
 I will discuss the more specific issues initially. First, there is po-
tentially a class problem in evaluations of labor, in that many exam-
ples of prebirth labor—setting up a nursery in one’s house, for exam-
ple—cost money.296 To the extent that fathers with more money have 
more examples of prebirth labor open to them, this is a significant 
concern, particularly as low-income fathers already face structural 
barriers to parental engagement.297 It can be cabined, however, with 
a few observations. As with other evaluations of parental qualifica-
tions, any assessment of a father’s prebirth labor should be evaluated 
with an eye to his individual circumstances. The absence of forms of 
labor that cost money should not be penalized where the father would 
be unable to afford them. Interestingly, although it seems intuitive 
that fathers with more financial resources would have more freedom 
to spend time with their children, evidence indicates that the reverse 
is true, possibly because lower-income parents who both work are 
forced to collaborate on caretaking duties due to economic pres-
sures.298 It is clear, however, that economic issues are inadequately 
addressed for parents and families generally.299 
 Another question is whether recognizing the prebirth parental la-
bor of unwed biological fathers would overcount such contributions: 
might this swing the pendulum from one extreme to the other, where 
checking a single book out of the library about child development is 
seen as equivalent in certain ways to the greater labor and costs ac-
crued by the biological mother? A similar concern arose in the context 
of custody determinations. Because men typically do not perform 
caretaking labor, a presumption arises that the amount of caretaking 
necessary to rise to the notice of a court, or even to generate praise as 
an active father, is far less than half the overall burden.300 In the con-
text of prebirth parental labor as used to vest parental rights, howev-
er, this concern is significantly different than in the custody context. 
In a custody determination, legal fathers are already recognized, 
with attendant obligations such as child support. Replicating paren-
tal caretaking in a way that overcounts the father’s labor in many 
 296. Shari Motro provocatively linked the financial and relational aspects of 
parenthood in proposing that tax deductions be given to unmarried men who supported 
their pregnant lovers, which she termed “preglimony.” See Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 647 (2011).  
 297. See Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men as Fathers: The Courts, the Law, and Father-
Absence in Low-Income Families, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 524-25 (2013). 
 298. Dowd, supra note 233, at 1318.  
 299. Nancy E. Dowd, Essay, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining 
Fatherhood, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 132, 135 (2003) (“Economic policy is foremost. Lim-
ited or no economic support means class-limited fatherhood.”). 
 300. Rosenblum, supra note 235, at 75. 
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cases will reduce a child support obligation, raising serious strategic 
issues. The imposition of financial responsibility cuts the other way 
in the context of vesting parental status: an unwed biological father 
who actively claims parental status is voluntarily assuming what 
could be a significant child support obligation. A particularly devious 
soon-to-be father could conceivably claim parental status because he 
anticipated the biological mother pursuing child support from him 
and planned to minimize the burden by later making a custody claim 
to lower the obligation, but the links become so attenuated that the 
concern should diminish. 
 As a final proposal-specific concern, recognition of the parental 
status of an unwed biological father by incorporating prebirth paren-
tal labor could be viewed as preventing the acquisition of parental 
status by two parties. First, the Supreme Court cases dealing with 
unwed biological fathers generally deal with attempts to adopt the 
child in question by the child’s existing stepfather.301 To the extent 
that unwed biological fathers are more able to assert their parental 
status, my proposal could correspondingly prevent adoption efforts by 
such stepfathers. One easy answer to this question is provided by the 
suggestion, discussed above, that more than two legal parents be rec-
ognized. In such a context, the functional parental status of a stepfa-
ther could be recognized without requiring termination of the paren-
tal status of the biological father. In the absence of such reforms, 
however, this is likely a vanishingly small criticism. Incorporating a 
labor-based understanding into the recognition of unwed biological 
fathers does not suddenly recognize every single unwed biological 
father as legal father. To the extent that some biological fathers do 
pursue parental status, this is likely to the benefit of the child in 
question, who now has support from both biological parents as well 
as potential stepparents. 
 Second, there is some history of procedures intended to benefit 
unwed biological fathers having perverse results. For example, in the 
early twenty-first century a majority of states created putative father 
registries: lists upon which a man places his name if he has a sexual 
encounter that might have resulted in the conception of a child.302 
The registry is then used to notify the biological father of an adoption 
proceeding involving the child.303 In theory, the existence of such reg-
istries provided men with an opportunity to timely assert parental 
rights. In practice, timely placing one’s name on a putative father 
registry—of which most men continue to be unaware—became the 
 301. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 
380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
 302. See Amy M. Clark, How Putative Father Registries Foster the Best Interest of the 
Child Standard, 1 APPALACHIAN J.L. 57, 58, 62 (2002). 
 303. Id. at 58.   
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first requirement to assert parental status, and if a man failed to do 
so it foreclosed claims that he might have otherwise had.304 In the 
same form, might acknowledgment of prebirth labor unintentionally 
harm men who do not know either about the law or even about the 
existence of the child? I argue that it does not: the absence of prebirth 
parental labor should not, as current doctrine requires, foreclose 
recognition of a substantial relationship with the child. Prebirth pa-
rental labor cannot be compared, therefore, to putative father regis-
tries or other formal requirements.  
 A second set of concerns arise from broader objections to intent as 
a parentage rule. In this context, the strength of labor-based theories 
of intent becomes clear. One common concern with intent is that if 
intent becomes a single rule upon which parental status turns, peo-
ple who currently have parentage imposed upon them, such as unwed 
biological fathers upon whom child support obligations are imposed, 
will evade such responsibilities by simply claiming they did not     
intend to be a parent. A common response from proponents of intent 
is to argue that intent should be a path into parenthood, but not a 
way to evade parenthood.305 Labor makes this clearer: no one is able 
to evade parental responsibilities by simply refusing to do them. La-
bor thus provides a more tangible example of how intent-based rules 
can supplement, rather than replace, other rules such as biological 
relationships. 
 Another worry, discussed above, is that intent can be manipulated 
by strategic actors.306 Again, because labor is a more tangible com-
mitment than mere expression of intent, it is a larger burden for a 
potential parent seeking to exploit parental rules. Furthermore, sta-
tus as legal parent does not guarantee greater custody or visitation 
rights or a lower child support burden: such decisions would still be 
made using the standard of the best interests of the child, as they are 
currently. This individualized evaluation has been settled upon in 
part because it should identify strategic parents who ask for custody 
solely as a litigation tactic in custody proceedings, and should serve 
the same purpose here. Finally, even intent as demonstrated through 
labor is more difficult to evaluate than genetic connection or marital 
presumptions, as it is not a bright line rule. Nancy Dowd pointed out, 
however, that the best interests standard is similarly individual-
 304. Timothy L. Arcaro, No More Secret Adoptions: Providing Unwed Biological Fa-
thers with Actual Notice of the Florida Putative Father Registry, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 449, 
451-52 (2008). Jonathan Lehr, for example, had failed to file with the New York putative 
father registry, which foreclosed his right to assert a due process or equal protection viola-
tion. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264-65 (1983). 
 305. Melanie Jacobs goes further, to argue that the obligations and rights of parentage 
should be split in some circumstances between multiple people. See Jacobs, My Two Dads, 
supra note 90, at 813. 
 306. See supra Part IV.A.  
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ized—and while it is undoubtedly more burdensome than a bright 
line custody rule such as the tender years doctrine, the additional 
work is justified by results that are significantly better for chil-
dren.307 A similar calculus applies here. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Parentage is often colloquially described as eighteen years of hard 
labor. Although intended as a joke, such observations have a basis in 
fact: parentage is increasingly understood as created by labor, in ad-
dition to remnants of theories of bodily unity based in genetic connec-
tions. Rigorous analysis of a labor-based theory of parentage demon-
strates deficiencies in the current regime as well as points a way to-
ward reforms that will not only have tangible benefits for children 
and parents, but also create a more unified body of parentage law. 
 307. See Dowd, supra note 290, at 940. 
                                                                                                                                        
